Page 194 - An Introduction to Political Communication Third Edition

PRESSURE-GROUP POLITICS

Where British Leyland had led, other managements followed,
compelling union negotiators to accept that they, too, would have
to embrace communication techniques which involved co-operation
with, rather than huffy dismissal of, the ‘capitalist media’. This
would require an appreciation of the media’s demands and news-
values, and attention to the presentation as well as the substance of
a negotiating position.
During the rail strike of 1982 the National Union of Railway-
workers did precisely this, making the dispute, in Jones’s view,
the first in which ‘a substantial attempt at negotiating through the
news media was made’ (1986, p. 4). In the 1984–5 miners’ strike,
notwithstanding the bitterness and violence which accompanied the
dispute, National Union of Mineworkers’ leaders, and Arthur
Scargill in particular, pursued a determinedly pro-active communi-
cation strategy, using the media where possible to disseminate the
miners’ positions to NUM rank and file members, other unions
and the British public as a whole. Scargill, like Edwardes before
him, appeared in television interviews only if he was ‘live’ and in
complete control of the use made of his remarks. Indeed, his
readiness to make public defences of the miners’ case and the
competence with which he did so in the face of invariably hostile
interviewing techniques, made a sharp contrast to the evasiveness
and lack of presentational ability demonstrated by National Coal
Board Chairman Ian McGregor, whose most memorable moment of
the campaign was to be filmed with a plastic bag over his head as he
sought to avoid the attentions of reporters.
Both the NUM and the management of British Coal broke new
ground in communication terms by accepting an invitation from
Channel 4 News to prepare contributions to the programme, over
which they had complete editorial control, outlining their respective
arguments. The Coal Board spent £4.5 million on advertising its
case in the press.
Despite the energy and innovative flair applied by the NUM to
its public relations campaign, it failed to prevent the destruction
of most of Britain’s coal industry and a historic victory for
the Thatcher government, still seeking retribution for the miners’
role in the humiliation and downfall of the Heath government.
Explanations for the miners’ defeat have subsequently been sought
in the NUM’s failure to organise a pre-strike ballot and thus
legitimise the action among those miners who, in the absence of a
ballot, chose to carry on working. The strike came at a time when
coal stocks were exceptionally high, and the winter of 1984–5 was

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