Page 198 - An Introduction to Political Communication Third Edition

PRESSURE-GROUP POLITICS

factured’ news and turned the media into transmission belts for
a potent political message – there is a growing risk of nuclear
conflict between the superpowers, and we are here to protest
about it.
The perceived threat to political stability posed by the demon-
strators, and growing popular opposition to a central tenet of the
Western powers’ strategic military policy, was sufficient to generate
a sustained counter-offensive on the part of NATO governments.
In Britain, the Defence Minister Michael Heseltine was frequently
filmed at the Berlin Wall, warning citizens of the ‘threat’ against
which NATO’s nuclear weapons were the only protection. On
one famous occasion he took part – suitably attired – in a military
expedition to ‘retake’ the Molesworth cruise missile base from
protesters who had camped outside its perimeter fence. This event,
indeed, was largely responsible for Mr Heseltine’s acquiring the
nickname of ‘Tarzan’, which haunted him for the rest of his time in
government.
These events, like those of the peace movement on the opposite
side of the political divide, were symbolic acts of political communi-
cation, designed to highlight the nature of the Soviet threat on the
one hand and the resolution of NATO governments on the other.
Their impact on public opinion at the time is difficult to ascertain,
but they had the unintended effect of increasing the newsworthiness
of the peace movement, adding to its ‘cultural capital’ and
legitimising it as a definer of events. Once it became clear that
members of the politico-military establishment took CND and
the other anti-nuclear organisations seriously, media organisations
followed suit. In one notable example of this effect, Mr Heseltine’s
announcement in 1983 that his government would be spending
some £1 million of public money on anti-CND propaganda
generated numerous headlines for the peace movement and
significantly raised its profile as a legitimate participant in the
nuclear debate. While an innovative approach to communication
and media management permitted the peace movement to gain
access to news media, official responses to that access reinforced its
visibility and authority. The Defence Secretary’s ‘cultural capital’
was transferred, in part, to a competitor.
It would be misleading to suggest, however, that the peace
movement came anywhere near to dominating the debate as
mediated by broadcasting and the press. First, the defence
establishment used its privileged access to intervene at key
moments in the peace movement’s campaigning. I have described

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