Page 362 - Beyond Decommissioning

338 Beyond Decommissioning

(FIMS). Upon investigation, the NTESS verified that the Tower 22-00 had been
removed in May 2017. On February 13, 2018, the NTESS notified the SFO that Tower
22-00 had been demolished prior to completion of the required NEPA process, includ-
ing consultation with the SHPO. It was further found out that Tower 12-00 had also
been demolished in May 2017. Tower 12-00 was confirmed to also meet management
reporting criterion. In summary, both Contraves Towers (Buildings 22-00 and 12-00)
had been demolished prior to completion of the NEPA process, including consultation
with the SHPO.
Lessons learned: This event highlights several administrative mishaps, which can
be somehow understood in the light of the following. Segregation of “historical” vs
“nonhistorical” structures in view of potential redevelopment is not normal practice
at industrial decommissioning projects as there are few projects for which this segre-
gation would be applicable.
Should a historically eligible structure be identified at any point during such a pro-
ject at least as a potential issue, the point should be reported to management before the
project moves into procurement.

7.14.12 Collapse of portion of awning at entrance to 773-A,
Savannah River National Laboratory, United States
(U.S. Department of Energy, 2018b)

Problem encountered: A near miss occurred in SRNL building, 773-A on February 21,
2018 when the front part of the awning above the main entrance to the building fell to
the ground. No employees were in the immediate vicinity at the time of the incident.
The management was notified and barricades were erected at once. The structural
integrity of the remaining portion of the awning will be assessed and follow-up actions
defined. The awning was determined to be non-asbestos material.
Lessons learned: This case may apply to most old buildings eligible for redevel-
opment and strengthens the need for complete structural assessment.

7.14.13 Cut buried conduit/cable, Y12 National Security Complex,
United States (U.S. Department of Energy, 2018c)
Problem encountered: On March 15, 2018, a subcontractor working under an
approved excavation permit cuts an energized conduit/cable while trenching, which
resulted in a circuit breaker tripping. This event caused no injuries. During the initial
subsurface investigation prior to excavating, the surveyors detected a 60-Hz signal in
an area with a known underground electrical service. The ground was marked with
paint to identify the location. In compliance with the excavation permit, the subcon-
tractor hand dug the trench in the marked zone 60cm on each side of the marked line to
the 50cm depth of their trench. Not having located the underground conduit the sub-
contractor concluded the energized service was deeper than their trench. The subcon-
tractor, contrary to the excavation permit and procedure, backfilled the hand
excavation trench, ran the mechanical excavator through the previously hand dug spot,