Page 408 - Challenges in Corrosion Costs Causes Consequences and Control(2015)

386 CONSEQUENCES OF CORROSION

the rupture was 60 cm in size. The pipe wall at the rupture site had thinned from 10
to 1.5 mm in thickness.
Mihama-3 is an 826 MW Mitsubishi-built pressurized water reactor (PWR) plant
situated in Mihama, Japan, 320 km west of Tokyo. The carbon steel pipe carried the
high-temperature steam at high pressure and the pipe was not inspected since the
inception of the plant in 1976. In April 2003, Nihon Arm, a maintenance subcontrac-
tor informed Kansai Electric Power Company, the plant owner, that there could be
a problem. Then the power company scheduled an ultrasonic inspection for August
2004. Four days before the scheduled inspection, superheated steam blew the 60-cm
wide hole in the pipe. The steam that escaped was not in contact with the nuclear
reactor and hence no nuclear contamination has been reported.
In response to the accident, Japan’s Nuclear and Industry Safety Agency ordered
four other power companies that owned nuclear plants with the same type of PWRs
to conduct ultrasonic inspections of their pipes. The ultrasonic inspections were to
involve nearly half of the country’s 52 nuclear power plants.
Japan has the world’s third largest nuclear power industry, after the United States
and France. The government was planning to build 11 more reactors in the decade,
thus increasing Japan’s reliance on home-based nuclear power to 40% of electricity
needs. However, there was local opposition to nuclear power generating projects in
view of the most deadly history of nuclear power in Japan.

5.3.7.4.24 Sinking Ships On December 12, 1999, the Maltese-registered tanker
Erika broke in two, some 70 km from the French coast off Brittany while carrying
∼30,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. About 19,000 tons were spilled, which is equal to
the amount of oil lost worldwide in 1998. The sunken bow section still contained
6400 tons of cargo and the stern had a further 4700 tons. The bow section sank within
24 h. The stern section sank on December 13 while under tow.
The economic consequences of the incident have been felt across the region; a
drop in the income from tourism, loss of income from fishing, and a ban on the trade
of sea products, including oysters and crabs, have added to the discomfort of local
populations.
Corrosion problems had been apparent on Erika since 1994 with details readily
available to port state control authorities and potential charterers. In addition, there
were numerous deficiencies in her firefighting and inert gas systems, pointing to a
potential explosion risk on the tanker. Lloyd’s list reported that severe corrosion had
been discovered just weeks before the incident. However, no immediate remedial
action had been taken.
According to the US Coast Guard records publicly available and obtained by
Lloyd’s List, the Erika had been inspected in a variety of US ports on several
occasions since 1994. The certificate of financial responsibility, a document legally
required by tankers wishing to trade in US waters, had expired in March 1999 and
not renewed as of November 30, 1999. During an inspection in Portland in July 1994,
holes were discovered in the main deck coatings indicating that signs of corrosion
were already in place less than 5 years prior to the catastrophe. The observation
showed the presence of holes in the port side and starboard inert gas system risers,