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                    140  COMMUNICA TION THEORY
                    can only be upheld in an instrumental model of communication. In ritual
                    views, however, there is no separation; the medium is the context.
                        But the mediation view is very entrenched. It is even built in to
                    nomenclatures of communication like ‘computer-mediated-communication’.
                    The problem with the mediation view is that it replicates, in the field
                    of communication studies, what is endemic to common-sense views of
                    technology-in-general – an instrumental perspective. It does not see com-
                    munication technology as substantively capable of its own context and
                    the dependence that individuals might have on this context.
                        The difference between instrumental and substantive views of
                    technology is well explored by Feenberg (1991). In Feenberg’s account,
                    the instrumental perspective ‘treats technology as subservient to values
                    established in other social spheres (e.g. politics and culture)’, while sub-
                    stantive theory ‘attributes an autonomous cultural force to technology
                    that overrides all traditional or competing values’ (5). Substantive theory
                    sees technology as embedded in circuits of interaction, and ‘argues that
                    technology constitutes a new type of cultural system that restructures the
                    entire world as an object of control’ (5). The more technology comes to
                    mediate the kinds of engagement and interaction individuals have with
                    the world, the more it takes on the character of an environment rather
                    than a tool. Moreover, technology has the power to encourage individu-
                    als to view environments in particular ways that are shaped by the means
                    they have of relating to them.
                        Raymond Williams’ distinction between technical invention and
                    technology-as-socially-configured is valuable here (Williams, 1974). He
                    suggests that in fact even in the first media age ‘technology’ cannot be
                    empiricized (i.e. technology-as-object) but, in a more Heideggerian way,
                    is always-already located as a medium (e.g. broadcasting).
                        This blind spot of second media age thinkers for not seeing tech-
                    nology in this wider sense allows them, in my view, to conflate their own
                    critique of first media age theory with their projection of first media age
                    ‘technologies’ as fundamentally tool-like. For this reason, so much is
                    invested in the term ’cyberspace’, whereas, if Williams’ distinction is
                    adopted (with the addition of a list of qualifiers about the nature of inter-
                    action in broadcast technology), first media age technology might also be
                    considered a kind of cyberspace, serving to level further the distinction
                    between first and second media age.




                    Medium theory and individuality

                    Like transmission accounts, medium theory typically looks at how the
                    position of the communicants and the information communicated is deter-
                    mined by different media. But it also suggests something quite radical and
                    different from transmission accounts – the possibility that individuality
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