Page 101 - Communication and the Evolution of Society

78 Communication and Evolution of Society

for such deviations? How do the stage of development and basic in-
stitutions of a society interfere with an ontogenetic developmental
?
pattern
I would like to deal with these difficulties in turn. First I shall
isolate a central and well-examined aspect of ego development,
namely moral consciousness. Even here I shall consider only the
cognitive side, the ability to make moral judgments. (In Schema
1a I have coordinated the stages of moral consciousness proposed
by Kohlberg with Schema 1, the stages of ego development pro-
posed by Jane Loevinger, in order to emphasize that moral
development represents a part of the development of personality
that is decisive for ego identity.) I shall then show that Kohl-
berg’s stages of moral consciousness satisfy the formal conditions
for a developmental logic by reformulating these stages within
a general action-theoretic framework. Last I shall remove the
restriction to the cognitive side of communicative action and
show that ego identity requires not only cognitive mastery of
general levels of communication but also the ability to give
one’s own needs their due in these communication structures;
as long as the ego is cut off from its internal nature and disavows
the dependency on needs that still await suitable interpretations,
freedom, no matter how much it is guided by principles, remains
in truth unfree in relation to existing systems of norms.

Il

Kohlberg defines six stages in a rationally reconstructible de-
velopment of moral consciousness. To begin with, moral con-
sciousness expresses itself in judgments about morally relevant
conflicts of action. I call those action conflicts ‘‘morally relevant”
that are capable of consensual resolution. The moral resolution
of conflicts of action excludes the manifest employment of force
as well as “cheap” compromises; it can be understood as a con-
tinuation of communicative action—that is, action oriented to
reaching understanding—with discursive means. Thus the only
resolutions permitted are those which:

Harm the interests of at least one of the parties involved or affected;
Nevertheless, permit a transitive ordering of the interests involved