Page 105 - Communication and the Evolution of Society
P. 105

82                         Communication  and  Evolution  of  Society

           This  empirically  supported  classification  of  expressions  of
         moral  judgment  is  supposed  to  satisfy  the  theoretical  claim  to
         represent  developmental  stages  of  moral  consciousness.  If  we
         now  take  upon  ourselves  the  burden  of  proof  for  this  clatm—a
         claim  that  Kohlberg  himself  has  not  made  good—we  commit
         ourselves  to  show  that  the  descriptive  sequence  of  moral  types
         represents  a  developmental-logical  nexus  (in  Flavell’s  sense).
         I  should  like  to  arrive  at  this  goal  through  connecting  moral
         consciousness  with  general  qualifications  for  role  behavior.  The
         following  three  steps  serve  this  end:  first  I  introduce  structures
         of  possible  communicative  action  and,  indeed,  in  the  sequence
         in  which  the  child  grows  into  this  sector  of  the  symbolic  universe.
         I  then  coordinate  with  these  basic  structures  the  cognitive  abili-
         ties  (or  competences)  that  the  child  must  acquire  in  order  to  be
         able  to  move  at  the  respective  level  of  his  social  environment;
         that  is,  taking  part  first  in  incomplete  interactions,  then  in  com-
         plete  interactions,  and  finally  in  communications  that  require
         passing  from  communicative  action  to  discourse.  Second,  I  want
         to  look  at  this  sequence  of  general  qualifications  for  role  be-
         havior  (at  least  provisionally)  from  developmental-logical  points
         of  view  in  order,  finally,  to  derive  the  stages  of  moral  conscious-
         ness  from  these  stages  of  interactive  competence.
           I  begin  with  the  basic  concepts  of  communicative  action  that
         must  be  presupposed  for  the  perception  of  moral  conflicts.  These
         include.  concrete  behavioral  expectations  and  corresponding  in-
         tentional  actions;  then  generalized  behavioral  expectations  that
         are  reciprocally  connected  with  one  another,  that  is,  social  roles
         and  norms  that  regulate  actions;  principles  that  can  serve  to
         justify  or  to  generate  norms;  the  situational  elements  that  are
         connected  with  actions  (e.g.,  action  consequences)  or  with  norms
         (e.g.,  as  conditions  of  application  or  as  side  effects);  also  actors
         who  communicate  with  one  another  about  something;  and  finally
         Orientations,  insofar  as  they  are  effective  as  motives  for  action,  I
         am  adopting  the  action-theoretic  framework  introduced  by  Mead
         and  developed  by  Parsons,  without  thereby  accepting  conven-
         tional  role  theory.4®  (In  Schema  3  I  have  ordered  these  compo-
         nents  from  the  perspective  of  the  socialization  of  the  growing
              )
         child.
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