Page 140 - Communication and the Evolution of Society

117 The Development of Normative Structures

structures in the spheres of ontogenesis and species history. The
very concept of a developmental logic requires additional sharpen-
ing before we can say formally what it means to describe the
direction of development in ontogenesis and in the history of the
species by means of such concepts as universalization and indi-
vidualization, decentration, autonomization, and becoming reflec-
tive. If I stick to this theme in spite of the (for the time being)
unsatisfactory degree of explication, it is because I am convinced
that normative structures do not simply follow the path of de-
velopment of reproductive processes and do not simply respond
to the pattern of system problems, but that they have instead an
internal history. In earlier investigations I have tried to argue that
holistic concepts such as productive activity and Praxis have to be
resolved into the basic concepts of communicative action and pur-
posive rational action in order to avoid confusing the two ra-
tionalization processes that determine social evolution;*' the
rationalization of action takes effect not only on productive forces
but also, and independently, on normative structures.*”
Pur posive-rational actions can be regarded under two different
aspects—the empirical efficiency of technical means and the con-
sistency of choice between suitable means. Actions and action
systems can be rationalized in both respects. The rationality of
means requires technically utilizable, empirical knowledge; the
rationality of decisions requires the explication and inner con-
sistency of value systems and decision maxims, as well as the
correct derivation of acts of choice. I shall speak of strategic ac-
tion in the case of competing opponents insofar as they are deter-
mined by the intention of influencing each other’s decisions in a
purposive-rational way, that is, in a way oriented only to each’s
own success.
In contexts of social action, the rationalization of means and
the choice of means signifies a heightening of productive forces,
that is, a socially significant implementation of knowledge, with
the help of which we can improve the technical outfitting, organi-
zational deployment, and qualifications of available labor power.
Marx saw in this process the motor of social development. It is
of course necessary to distinguish more precisely among (a) the
rationality structures and (if appropriate) developmental logic