Page 143 - Communication and the Evolution of Society

120 Communication and Evolution of Society

sensual regulation of conflicts, by means of intrapsychic as well
as interpersonal communicative barriers.** Rationalization means
overcoming such systematically distorted communication in which
the action-supporting consensus concerning the reciprocally raised
validity claims—especially the consensus concerning the truthful-
ness of intentional expressions and the rightness of underlying
norms—can be sustained in appearance only, that is, counter-
factually. The stages of law and morality, of ego demarcations
and world-views, of individual and collective identity formations,
are stages in this process. Their progress cannot be measured
against the choice of correct strategies, but rather against the
intersubjectivity of understanding achieved without force, that is,
against the expansion of the domain of consensual action together
with the re-establishment of undistorted communication.
The categorial distinction between purposive-rational and com-
municative action thus permits us to separate the aspects under
which action can be rationalized. As learning processes take place
not only in the dimension of objectivating thought but also in
the dimension of moral-practical insight, the rationalization of
action is deposited not only in forces of production, but also—
mediated through the dynamics of social movements—in forms
of social integration.3* Rationality structures are embodied not
only in amplifications of purposive-rational action—that is, in
technologies, strategies, organizations, and qualifications—but
also in mediations of communicative action—in the mechanisms
for regulating conflict, in world views, and in identity forma-
tions. I would even defend the thesis that the development of
these normative structures is the pacemaker of social evolution,
for new principles of social organization mean new forms of social
integration; and the latter, in turn, first make it possible to im-
plement available productive forces or to generate new ones, as
well as making possible a heightening of social complexity.
The prominent place I have given to normative structures in
the framework of social evolution could lead to several misunder-
standings—one, that the dynamics of species history is to be ex-
plained through an internal history of spirit; and another, that a
developmental logic is once again to take the place of historical
contingencies. Behind the first misunderstanding lies the suspicion