Page 142 - Communication and the Evolution of Society

1I9 The Development of Normative Structures

aspect—from the framework of normatively guided communica-
tive action. In purposive-rational action it is supposed only that
each subject is following preferences and decision maxims that
he has determined for himself—that is, monologically, regardless
of whether or not he agrees therein with other subjects. When,
therefore, a strategic action system (e.g., war) makes it necessary
for several subjects to agree in certain preferences (and to the
extent that this agreement is not guaranteed in fact by the interest
situations), purposive-rational action has somehow to be bound
or institutionalized (e.g., in the framework of the Hague Con-
vention). Institutionalization again means the organization of
consensual action resting on intersubjectively recognized validity
claims.
Communicative action can be rationalized neither under the
technical aspect of the means selected nor under the strategic
aspect of the selection of means but only under the moral-practical
aspect of the responsibility of the acting subject and the justifi-
ability of the action norm. Whereas the rationalization of pur-
posive-rational action depends on the accumulation of true (em-
pirically or analytically true) knowledge, the rationalizable aspect
of communicative action has nothing to do with propositional
truth; but it has everything to do with the truthfulness of inten-
tional expressions and with the rightness of norms. The rationality
of action oriented to reaching understanding is measured against:

a. Whether a subject truthfully expresses his intentions in his ac-
tions (or whether he deceives himself and others because the norm of
action is so little in accord with his needs that conflicts arise that have
to be defended against unconsciously, through setting up internal bar-
riers to communication).
b. Whether the validity claims connected with norms of action, and
recognized in fact, are legitimate (or whether the existing normative
context does not express generalizable or compromisable interests, and
thus can be stabilized in its de facto validity only so long as those
affected can be prevented by inconspicuous restrictions on communica-
tion from discursively examining the normative validity claim).
Rationalization here means extirpating those relations of force
that are inconspicuously set in the very structures of communica-
tion and that prevent conscious settlement of conflicts, and con-