Page 197 - Communication and the Evolution of Society

174 Communication and Evolution of Society

functions, that is, according to the step-by-step separation of
variation, selection, and stabilization. Even if these criteria could
be applied to the historical material, they are unsatisfactory;
from functionalist points of view we can indeed distinguish
degrees of complexity, but not stages of evolution.
Even in natural evolution the degree of complexity is not a
sufficient condition for placing a species in the evolutionary rank
order; for increasing complexity in physical organization or mode
of life often proves to be an evolutionary dead end. A reliable
evolutionary classification is possible only if we know the inner
logic of a series of morphological changes or of an expansion of
reaction potential. The role played by the central nervous system
in phylogenetic comparison is prototypical here; we have to know
the general structure and logic of development of the CNS if we
want to classify different species according to the state of develop-
ment of this system.** In social evolution as well, we shall not
be able to classify social formations according to their state of
development until we know the general structures and develop-
mental logic of social learning processes. Corresponding to the
central nervous system here are the basic cognitive structures in
which technical and moral-practical knowledge are produced.

3. Social-scientific neoevolutionism is usually satisfied with the
directional criterion of increasing steering (or adaptive) capacity.
From this vantage point, the concepts and problems of a func-
tionalism developed along systems-theoretic lines are brought into
developmental] theory. Modernization theories, for example, move
within this methodological framework. The combination of the
conceptual repertoires of systems theory and evolution theory is
undoubtedly advantageous in investigating structural changes that
expand the steering capacity of a society. On the other hand, this
analytic gain has misled [some] to confuse structures of learning
capability with social complexity. A self-sufficient functionalism
fails to appreciate the fact that increases in complexity are in
each case possible only at the learning level attained in the or-
ganizational principle of the society in question. But we cannot
explain the establishment of new organizational principles with-
out knowing the basic structures specific to processes of socializa-