Page 71 - Communication and the Evolution of Society
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48                         Communication  and  Evolution  of  Society

           a’)  Share-the-speaker  presupposition  (a).
           b’)  Fulfill-the-speaker  presupposition  (b),  that  is,  actually  identify
         the  object  referred  to,
           c’)  Undertake  for  his  part  the  act  of  predication  (c).
           It  is  otherwise  with  the  zllocutionary  components  of  utterances
         (3)  and  (4).  A  hearer  can  understand  the  meaning  of  notifying
         or  asking  under  the  condition  that  he  has  learned  to  take  part  in
         successful  speech  acts  of  the  following  type:

                6)  “I  (hereby)  notify  you  that...”

                7)  “I  (hereby)  ask  you  whether  ..  .”

         that  is,  has  learned  to  assume  both  the  role  of  the  (acting)  speaker
         as  well  as  that  of  the  (cooperating)  hearer.  The  performance  of
         an  illocutionary  act  cannot  serve  to  report  an  observation  as  the
         use  of  a  propositional  sentence  can;  and  the  ability  to  have  per-
         ceptions  is  also  not  essentially  presupposed  here.  Rather,  con-
         versely,  the  execution  of  a  speech  act  is  a  condition  of  possibility
         of  an  experience,  namely  the  communicative  experience  that  the
         hearer  has  when  he  accepts  the  offer  contained  in  the  attempted
         speech  action  and  enters  into  the  requested  connection  with  the
         speaker.
           Whereas  understanding  (5)  presupposes  the  possibility  of
         sensory  experiences  (experiences  of  the  type:  observation),  un-
         derstanding  (6)  and  (7)  itself  represents  a  communicative  ex-
         perience  (an  experience  of  the  type:  “‘participant  observation’”’).
           The  difference  between  originally  illocutionary  and  originally
         propositional  meanings  (force  and  meaning  in  Austin’s  sense)
         can  be  traced  back  to  differences  in  possible  learning  situations.
         We  learn  the  meaning  of  illocutionary  acts  only  in  the  performa-
         tive  attitude  of  participants  in  speech  actions.  By  contrast,  we
         learn  the  meaning  of  sentences  with  propositional  content  in  the
         objectivating  attitude  of  observers  who  correctly  report  their  ex-
         perfiences  in  propositions.”®  We  acquire  originally  illocutionary
         meanings  in  connection  with  communicative  experiences  that  we
         have  in  entering  upon  the  level  of  intersubjectivity  and  estab-
         lishing  interpersonal  relations.  We  acquire  originally  proposi-
         tional  meanings  in  reporting  something  that  happens  in  the  world.
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