Page 118 - Communication Commerce and Power The Political Economy of America and the Direct Broadcast Satellite

5 DBS and the Structure of

US Policy Making

In 1967, the Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Dante R. Fascell, wrote that during 'the coming
decade, television promises to become the most widely used and
influential mass medium of communication' capable of fostering 'eco-
nomic and social change in developing nations.' Direct broadcast
satellites, Fascell predicted, would spearhead this movement largely
as a result of the capacity of DBS to transcend the 'physical' and
'political boundaries' that traditionally have constituted the primary
'barriers to the flow of communications.' 1
Two years later, in a report issued by the same House of Repres-
entatives committee, the development of international telesatellite
broadcasting was directly associated with the 'vital interest' of the
United States. The reasons were the perceived importance of main-
taining America's world leadership in communications technology; its
position as world leader in the promotion of the free flow of informa-
tion; and through both of these, the importance of having a direct role
in shaping what impact such new technologies would have on the
international order. But largely due to the structural characteristics of
the American state, most clearly expressed in the tendency of US
officials to focus on case-by-case issues, the ability of the public sector
to lead or even coordinate various private sector interests generally
has been absent. 2 From the late 1960s, occasional Congressional
hearings reviewed the prospects and implications of DBS while mem-
bers of Congress and federal officials repeatedly bemoaned the
absence of a well-coordinated foreign communication policy. Joel
3
Woldman's Senate study on direct broadcasting, cited in Chapter 4,
considered DBS to be an important new technology in extending the
domination of US-based private sector mass-media products in
overseas markets. However, the potential foreign backlash that
could arise from this dominance, expressed through the potential
imposition of foreign trade barriers to a broad range of
American products could, according to Woldman, lead to 'diplomatic,
as well as economic problems.' As such, the 1975 Senate report
4
concluded that

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