Page 154 - Communication Commerce and Power The Political Economy of America and the Direct Broadcast Satellite

144 Communication, Commerce and Power

Many LDCs, relative to most advanced industrialized countries,
considered the effects of an enforceable intellectual property rights
regime to be exclusionary. In the absence of enforceable agreements,
LDC-based businesses could maintain their access to relatively inex-
pensive supplies of pirated information-based products, including
valuable software programs and new technologies. Moreover, by
copying only the most successful products, research and development
costs can be significantly reduced and marketing ·risks minimized.
LDC state officials generally recognized that industries producing
counterfeit goods can employ thousands of people. All in all, despite
TNC threats to withdraw investments, LDCs and the entrepreneurs
operating in them generally have been more interested in maintaining
their access to a relatively inexpensive supply of information-based
resources than in remunerating foreign owners. 48
A central role in the development of a GAIT -based intellectual
property rights regime subsequently was played by elements of the US
private sector. Broad-based organizations such as the Intellectual
Property Committee, the US Chamber of Commerce, the Council
for International Business, and others, developed 'minimal standards
acceptable to industry' that were communicated through various offi-
cial and unofficial channels to both US and foreign government
personne1. 49 This GAIT-based intellectual property agreement also
was pursued by two interrelated organizations - the Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA) and the International Intellectual
Property Alliance (liP A). 50

6.3 FREE TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

In November 1990, in response to pressures by AT&T and several
other US-based TNCs, USTR GAIT negotiators announced that
countries not granting US firms the same kind of access that their
corporations enjoy in the American services market would be
excluded from any prospective agreement. One of 'the most active
and arguably the most crucia1' 51 of service trade negotiating groups
that emerged with these reciprocity ideals in mind was the Working
Group on Telecommunications Services. Established in May of that
year, the group first debated the 'proper place' of telecommunications
within the GAIT as a whole. At this time the key question for trade
negotiators was whether a telecommunications agreement should be
handled within the framework of a general agreement on the delivery