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40           Communication,  Commerce and Power

           21   On this general perspective, see Paul Levinson, Mind at Large: Knowing
               in the  Technological Age (Greenwich, Conn. JAI Press,  1988).
           22   Ian Parker, 'Myth, Telecommunication and the Emerging Global Infor-
               mational Order: The Political Economy of Transitions', in Comor (  ed.  ),
               The  Global Political Economy of  Communication, p. 47.
           23   Susan Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988) p.
               25.
           24   Ibid.,  p.  115.
           25   Ibid., see esp.  pp.  126-31.
           26   Ibid., p.  ll8.
           27   Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the
               Making of  History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987) p. 2.
           28   See  L.  David Ritchie,  'Another Turn of the Information  Revolution,
               Relevance,  Technology,  and the  Information Society',  Communication
               Research  18 (3) (June 1991) 412-27.
           29   Stephen Gill, 'Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neo-
               liberalism', Millennium,  24 (3) (Winter 1995) 422.
           30   Theda Skocpol,  'Bringing  the State Back In:  Strategies of Analysis  in
               Current  Research',  in  Peter  B.  Evans,  Dietrich  Rueschemeyer  and
               Theda  Skocpol  (eds.),  Bringing  the  State  Back  In  (Cambridge:  Cam-
               bridge University Press,  1985) p. 9.
           31   Ibid.,  p.  11.
           32   Robert W. Cox, Production,  Power,  and World Order, p. 6.  Cox defines
               'historical structures' as the 'persistent social practices, made by collec-
               tive human activity and transformed through collective human activity'
               - p. 4.  By the term 'state structure,' Cox means 'both the machinery of
               government  and enforcement (where  power lies  among the policy-ela-
               borating and enforcement agencies ...  )  and the historic bloc on which
               the state rests' - p.  254.
           33   Ibid.,  p.  6.
           34   Craig  N.  Murphy,  International  Organization  and  Industrial  Change,
               Global Governance since 1840 (Cambridge: Polity Press,  1994) pp. 27-8.
           35   Cox,  Production,  Power,  and World Order, p. 410, fn.  10.
           36   Ibid.,  p. 254.
           37   Ibid., pp. 399--400.
           38   See  David  Harvey,  The  Condition  of Postmodernity  (Oxford:  Basil
               Blackwell,  1990) esp.  pp.  121-97.
           39   Robert W. Cox, 'The Global Political Economy and Social Choice', in
               Cox, Approaches to  World Order, p.  193.
           40   Ibid.
           41   Among the preconditions for this fraction's success are the following: its
               ability  to  unite various  interests  both through its willingness  to make
               compromises and provide economic and ideational leadership; its com-
                patibility with other domestic and international political and economic
                interests  and growth  strategies;  and,  fundamentally,  its essential  com-
                patibility  with  predominant·  productive  capitalist  activities.  See  Rene
                Bugge Bertramsen, 'From the Capitalist State to the Political Economy',
                in  Bertramsen,  Jens  Peter Frolund Thomsen and Jacob Torfing (eds),
                State,  Economy and Society (London: Unwin Hyman, 1991) p.  ll2.
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