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Telesatellite Policy and DBS,  1962-1984     43

           their development of space-related technologies.  One funding recipi-
                                                     10
           ent was Hughes Aircraft. As with AT&T and the Radio Corporation
           of America  (RCA),  Hughes  submitted  proposals  for  research  con-
           tracts  involving  the  development  of telesatellites  in  1959  and  1960.
           In 1961,  NASA announced its partnership with AT&T in the devel-
           opment of the Telstar series of experimental satellites, beginning with
           the launch of Telstar I in July  1962. 11   RCA, with NASA, developed
           and placed into orbit the Relay satellite series beginning in December
           of that  same  year. 12   Both  Telstar  and  Relay  were  elliptical  orbit
           systems.  Because these satellites circled the earth approximately once
           every 2-hours and 40-minutes,  a  large number of vehicles  had to be
           launched so that at least one could maintain contact with two earth
           stations at any given time. Moreover, because of their ongoing move-
           ment in relation to a fixed point on earth, large and expensive tracking
           equipment  had  to  be  used  to  maintain  ground-station  to  satellite
           communications.
             These and related weaknesses of  elliptical systems provided Hughes
           with  an  opportunity  to  develop  what  was,  in  the  early  1960s,  the
           purely theoretical idea of placing a  satellite in a  geostationary orbit
           (GSO).  In contrast to elliptical  systems,  a  satellite in a  GSO would
           maintain a fixed  position in relation to a location on earth. In 1961,
           the DoD had conducted a series of failed laboratory GSO tests called
           the Advent program. Apparently because these failures  suggested to
           NASA officials that a GSO system was, at best, a long-term proposi-
           tion,  Hughes failed  to generate  the  same  large-scale support for  its
           funding  proposals  as  had  the  proponents  of elliptical  systems.  But
           beyond the theoretical nature of  the GSO, AT&T initially opposed its
           development due to the inherent conflicts that such a system posed for
           established common carrier interests.
             Hughes research into the technological feasibility of a GSO system
           began  in  1959.  In  February  1962,  Hughes  laboratory  experiments
           encouraged NASA to pay for the construction of  a small synchronous
           satellite  that could  be launched  using  contemporary rocket  techno-
           logies.  The DoD shared in  the  research  information  generated by
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           this experiment in exchange for  the use  of its international  ground-
           station facilities. 14  In February  1963,  the world's first  GSO satellite,
           called Syncom, was launched. The third Syncom satellite, Syncom III,
           was placed into orbit not coincidentally in time to transmit television
           signals from the Tokyo Olympic Games to the United States.
             Almost  a  year  prior  to  the  launch  of Syncom  I,  Hughes  Vice
           President  Allen  E.  Pucket explained  to a  Senate  subcommittee that
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