Page 204 - Comparing Media Systems THREE MODELS OF MEDIA AND POLITICS
P. 204

P1: GLB/IRK/kaa  P2: KAF
                          0521835356c06.xml  Hallin  0 521 83535 6  January 28, 2004  21:0






                                                       The Three Models

                                role of political parties and some other differences. The corporatist bar-
                                gain of the 1930s was preceded, in most countries, by an agreement to
                                adopt proportional representation, usually at the beginning of the twen-
                                tieth century. The Democratic Corporatist countries tend to have large
                                numbers of political parties and consensus, rather than majoritarian
                                politics, in Lijphart’s (1999) terms: they tend to have broad coalitions
                                in which no single party has a majority and to practice power sharing,
                                both among parties and among interest groups and cultural communi-
                                ties. Switzerland and Belgium are pure consensus systems and the other
                                countries covered here are mixed systems, most tending toward con-
                                sensus politics. They also tend toward moderate rather than polarized
                                pluralism (Sartori 1976) – with Germany and Austria, again, moving in
                                that direction after World War II. 22
                                   Democratic corporatism was able to develop in Northern Europe, ac-
                                cordingtoKatzenstein,becausethepoliticalrightwasrelativelyweakand
                                divided–incontrastbothtolargercountriessuchasGermanyandFrance
                                and to the countries of Southern Europe – and therefore unable to block
                                accommodation with the left. Feudalism was not strongly developed in
                                thelowcountries,inScandinavia,orinSwitzerland.Urbaninterestswere
                                stronger relative to the landed aristocracy, as was the independent peas-
                                antry. Economic activity frequently was carried out by “individual pro-
                                ducers residing in communities,” rather than by large landholders and
                                landless peasants, and political authority was often “concentrated in the
                                hands of producer-merchants” (157). In Switzerland, the Netherlands,
                                Belgium, and Denmark merchants engaged in long-distance trade had
                                strong influence, while in Scandinavia the independent peasantry was
                                particularly important. The existence of this independent peasantry –
                                in Denmark, for instance, peasants were freed in the 1780s and a land
                                reform was passed in the early nineteenth century – meant that, while in
                                Southern Europe and other areas where feudalism had been strong, the
                                aristocracy controlled the votes of the rural population, in Scandinavia
                                and other smaller countries independent agrarian parties were often
                                available for alliances with liberal or socialist forces. In Scandinavia,
                                moreover, the economically weak aristocracy often turned to commerce
                                in order to survive, making its interests less distinct from those of the
                                urban bourgeoisie. This social structure provided the context for the
                                early triumph of liberal institutions that was manifested in an early
                                development of a free press.

                                22
                                  Data on polarization and numbers of parties appear in Table 3.2.

                                                              186
   199   200   201   202   203   204   205   206   207   208   209