Page 111 - Conflict, Terrorism, and the Media In Asia

100 Michael Dillon
promoted to senior positions in the regional governments, but, on the whole, real
power remained in the hands of the predominantly Han Chinese officials of the
Communist Party (CCP), and ethnic minority cadres often faced tough tests of
loyalty.
Xinjiang has an extra layer of politico-economic administration that is not found
in any other region of China. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
(XPCC) was created in 1954 from (largely Han) units of the PLA when they were
demobilised. It runs farms and reclamation projects, and through its militia and
prison system plays an important role in the security of the border region. Its
status is equivalent to that of a province. XPCC bases have been the target of
attacks by separatist groups, partly because they have weapons and ammunition
and partly because they are a symbol of Beijing’s control in the region.

Social trends
The migration into Xinjiang of mainly Han Chinese from the east has created a
complex multi-layered society in which the distribution of economic benefits,
power and privilege is very unequal. Poor rural Uyghurs are at the bottom of the
social hierarchy whilst the government, party and military bureaucracies, which
are mostly but not exclusively Han, have a monopoly of political authority and
access to the lion’s share of better quality housing, well-paid employment and
consumer goods.
In between the two are the educated Uyghurs, often fluent both in their own
language and Chinese, who have in many cases moved to the cities and play a role
in the upper echelons of Xinjiang society. They might be doctors, engineers,
teachers, journalists or academic researchers. Their upward social mobility has,
in part, been due to the policies of the CCP which has in relatively liberal times,
encouraged young Uyghurs into mainstream careers. This has ensured a presence
of non-Han Chinese in key areas of Xinjiang society but at some cost to those
who have taken on this role. At best, they are viewed with considerable suspicion
by those who have remained in solely Uyghur communities. At worst, they are
seen as collaborators with an occupying power and traitors to the Uyghur people
and have been physically attacked and some even killed. The same is also true of
the Kyrgyz, Kazakh and other Muslim communities in Xinjiang.
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, even educated Uyghurs were largely
dependent on the state-controlled media for their information, but some interna-
tional media are now accessible to the population of Xinjiang. Radio Moscow did
broadcast in Uyghur and Kazakh during the Soviet era, although Russian is in any
case a language that is widely spoken in the northern border areas of Xinjiang
where there is a long-standing Russian minority population. However, these
broadcasts were primarily for propaganda purposes and were not highly valued in
the region. The BBC broadcasts in Uzbek, which is close enough to Uyghur to be
useful to the population of Xinjiang. Radio Free Asia has an Uyghur language
service which broadcasts regular programmes of news, current affairs and
cultural matters relating to Xinjiang and China. Although the station eschews