Page 112 - Conflict, Terrorism, and the Media In Asia

Uyghur separatism and nationalism in Xinjiang 101
support for separatism, its very existence is anathema to the Beijing government
which regards its broadcasts as unwarranted outside interference in its internal
affairs. The imprisonment of the successful Uyghur businesswoman and social
activist, Rebiya Kadir, who was awarded the Norwegian Rafto Prize in 2004, was
in part a consequence of her personal connections with Radio Free Asia. She was
released in March 2005.

Ethnic and religious issues
Social differentiation and social conflict is, needless to say, complicated by the
ethnic and religious background of the various communities. Han Chinese come
from a society which traditionally adhered to two main religions, Buddhism and
Daoism, which were practised throughout China, and to a wide range of local
beliefs and religious associations which focused on local deities, temples and
ancestral shrines. Organised religion in China had suffered a serious blow during
the years of war and civil war in the 1930s and 1940s, and it was one of the main
targets of the CCP when it took power in 1949. Religion in general was attacked
as feudal superstition especially during the more radical periods of the Great Leap
Forward (1958) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), but the CCP did make
some concessions to the religious practices of ethnic minorities (Dillon 2001: 5–6).
For many young Han Chinese, educated in state-run schools, religion is seen as
backward and at least partly responsible for slowing China’s progress. Some oth-
ers may belong to Christian communities (either official or underground), which
have seen a resurgence since the 1980s. There is likely to be little sympathy
towards Islam, which many Hans regard as an alien creed, viewing its mosques
with disdain and even revulsion.
For the non-Chinese population of Xinjiang, Islam is an essential part of their
identity, and, in the last resort, they are likely to define or identify themselves pri-
marily as Muslims in spite of the linguistic differences between them. The PRC has
sought to regulate Islam by imposing a national regulatory body, the Chinese
Islamic Association, and by requiring all mosques and madrassas (religious schools,
which play a key role in the education of the faithful and the training of clergy) to
register with local officials. Unregistered mosques and madrassas have been the
target of government campaigns and have frequently been forced to close down. 2
Some Imams and their communities, mainly from the most orthodox mainstream
Sunni tradition in Xinjiang have accepted this level of state control, but other
groups have not. There is a long tradition in Xinjiang of Sufi orders which oper-
ate outside the mainstream mosque network (although their members may also
attend the mosques). They are organised in a hierarchical system with the leader-
ship being transmitted hereditarily whenever possible. This hereditary succession
and their practices, which centre around direct communication between the indi-
vidual Sufi and Allah through the silent or vocal acknowledgement of Allah
(dhikr) accompanied by ritual dancing or chanting, depending on the particular
order, have separated them from mainstream Islam and brought them into conflict
with its authorities. Sufism is not, of course, a phenomenon found only in