Page 115 - Conflict, Terrorism, and the Media In Asia
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104 Michael Dillon
              Turkic peoples to the north and west of the Karakorum mountains. These bonds
              were severed during the Sino-Soviet dispute which lasted from 1960 (or even
              earlier) until Mikhail Gorbachev’s ill-fated visit to Beijing, during protests by
              students and citizens which were suppressed by the PLA, on 4 June 1989. The
              mass migration of Kazakhs, Uyghurs and others from north western Xinjiang into
              Kazakhstan in 1962 prompted China to seal its borders and contact between
              China and its western neighbours was minimal for decades.
                The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the creation of the new sovereign
              states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan changed cross border relations
              dramatically. China needed to forge diplomatic relations with the new states, and
              discussions on long standing border demarcation issues and troop reduction
              began almost immediately. The border routes across the mountains were opened
              to trade: informally they opened straightaway, but officially they were authorised
              from 1992 onwards. Families and communities, which had had little contact for
              many years, renewed their acquaintance and trade developed at a rapid pace.
                The new links were not restricted to commerce. Religious connections were
              also renewed and there were exchanges of political views. Independent Turkic
              Islamic states were immensely attractive to Uyghurs who looked to them for
              assistance in their own bid for independence. Initially there appeared to be seri-
              ous and genuine support from other  Turkic states, including  Turkey, but as
              China’s confidence in dealing with its Central Asian neighbours grew, Beijing
              made it perfectly clear that this support would be treated as unwarranted interfer-
              ence in China’s internal affairs and would not be tolerated. Beijing negotiated
              with the stick of its overwhelming military superiority and the carrot of lucrative
              trade and energy deals, and persuaded the Central Asian states that they should
              curb any political activities by their own Uyghur communities or on behalf of
              Uyghurs in China. The new Central Asian governments readily complied. They
              were concerned about the threat to their own stability from political Islamist
              movements (particularly in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). The demise of commu-
              nist regimes in Central Asia had led not to the hoped for democratisation of the
              region but to the emergence of authoritarian governments based partly on
              pre-Soviet clan and regional ties and partly on Soviet political culture. Although
              there was still distrust of China, they shared many common values.
                As part of the attack on separatists, both within China and across the border, a
              campaign was instigated to demonise them as criminals. Press reporting of trials
              of Uyghurs frequently included separatist activities in a list of charges that also
              referred to crimes such as armed robbery, murder and rape. In the minds of the
              reader, in particular the Han Chinese reader, the implication was quite clear: there
              was no legitimate political support for independence only the criminal activities
              of separatists.

              Shanghai Co-operation Organisation

              As China developed relations with its Central  Asian neighbours and Russia
              following the break-up of the Soviet Union, bilateral meetings on border and trade
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