Page 120 - Conflict, Terrorism, and the Media In Asia

Uyghur separatism and nationalism in Xinjiang 109
The motivations and ideologies of those involved in the demonstrations were
quite complex. Underlying it was the resentment at what was seen by many as the
unjustified occupation of their ancestral territory by the Chinese who were not
only not Uyghurs but also were not Muslims. Memories of the independent gov-
ernment of the 1940s were still strong as were family connections to those who
had served in those governments. There is no doubt that there was a highly devel-
oped sense of Uyghur or Eastern Turkistani nationalism, although it is difficult to
document this precisely as it could only be expressed in private, in clandestine
publications, or in illegal and therefore dangerous (potentially fatal) activities.
The religious component of the resistance was always there and linked the
demonstrators with the risings of the 1950s. The discourse of the demonstrators
was frequently expressed in Islamic terms, but at this stage the movement itself
was more nationalist than Islamist.
These disturbances were barely reported in the Chinese media at the time.
Short reports appeared in Xinjiang Daily and on the state-controlled radio broad-
casts from Urumqi and news of these filtered out to the west via the émigré
Uyghur community.

The Yining/Ghulja rising of February 1997
The insurrection of February 1997 in Yining/Ghulja was by far the most serious
of all the confrontations between the Uyghurs and the Chinese state. From the
point of view of the authorities, the ‘beating, smashing and looting’ (da za qiang)
incident on 5 February was no accident but had been planned for many years with
the object of splitting the motherland. Since 1995, separatists across the region
had been operating as the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party of God (Dong
Tujuesitan Yisilan Zhenzhudang) and its leader, Payzulla, together with a number
of other key figures had frequently been to the Yili region. They had also sent
more than twenty members from southern Xinjiang to Yili to preach jihad and
develop their organisation there. In January 1996, Payzulla sent people into the
villages of Yining and the rural counties attached to it to establish a training camp.
In January and February, supporters were sent to establish secret contacts, and it
was decided that there would be street demonstrations on the twenty-seventh day
of Ramadan (5 February). Abuduleilili, Abudumijiti and other key members
claimed that,

We are going on to the streets to carry out religious propaganda openly.
Whether we succeed or fail it will still be a success. Everyone can enter par-
adise. If we go to prison we will still have Allah’s blessing and protection and
those left outside will carry on the work.

On 4 February, Abudumijiti passed on to his supporters by word of mouth, the
slogans that were to be inscribed on the banners to be carried during the demon-
strations, and the time and the place where the demonstrators were to meet and
the route were finalised (Xu 1999: 177–178).