Page 124 - Conflict, Terrorism, and the Media In Asia
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Uyghur separatism and nationalism in Xinjiang 113
            contradictory. They claimed that he had been arrested in Xinjiang in 1993 and
            spent three years in a labour camp but that he was linked with a series of bombings
            in China in 1995.

            Terrorist activities and sabotage in Xinjiang
            Although overt and public resistance to Chinese rule has effectively been
            suppressed since the 1997 demonstrations in Yining/Ghulja, the activities of small
            militant groups continue, and these activities are likely to become more wide-
            spread and more daring as long as there are no alternative means of expressing
            separatist sentiments. During the late 1990s émigré sources reported that militant
            groups within Xinjiang were trying to set up urban guerrilla units to bring their
            struggle to the cities, which apart from Urumqi and on one occasion Beijing, had
            not been affected by separatist violence. To date, this has not happened, but it
            remains a possibility for the next decade as it would be one way of dramatically
            bringing home to the population of China the seriousness with which separatists
            in Xinjiang regard their struggle for independence. There could therefore be fur-
            ther bomb attacks in cities in Xinjiang other than Urumqi and in major cities
            throughout the rest of China. Large and relatively cosmopolitan cities like
            Shanghai and Guangzhou where there is already a small but significant Uyghur
            population are potential targets for this kind of attack. The public security forces
            are already on the alert for this kind of attack and from time to time groups of
            Uyghurs in cities in China proper have been rounded up and arrested and some-
            times sent back to Xinjiang or at least sent out of the cities in which they have
            been working, usually as traders. The reporting of these attacks, or danger of these
            attacks, became more open in the period after 11 September 2001 and was rein-
            forced by word of mouth and the informal system of communication that the CCP
            has maintained in its network of organisations since 1949.
              Sabotage has also been one of the tactics of the more militant groups of
            separatists, although it is extremely difficult to assess the effect that this sabotage
            has had because the authorities are very reluctant to attribute damage to separatist
            activities. From time to time there have been disruptions to rail and road com-
            munications and it has been suggested by émigré organisations that these were as
            a result of bombs or other kinds of damage to the track or rolling stock but the
            government has frequently attributed these to natural conditions such as excessive
            rainfall, snow or landslips. The prevention and detection of sabotage is clearly one
            of the priorities for the public security forces in Xinjiang as this is where it is most
            likely to occur. This would tie up the resources of the police and the security units
            of the XPCC.


            Xinjiang separatism and the media
            Media coverage of the conflict in Xinjiang has been patchy, to say the least. The
            Western media have largely ignored the issue, with the exception of a few articles
            in the quality press, a documentary on Channel 4 and an occasional mention in
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