Page 123 - Conflict, Terrorism, and the Media In Asia

112 Michael Dillon
movement that the US-led coalition was fighting. Later that month, the Foreign
Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, alleged that Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang had close
links with Osama bin Laden and that some militants had been trained in al Qaeda
training camps in Afghanistan. Many Uyghurs were outraged that their entire
community was being maligned by these assertions.
Even more difficult to assess is the long-term impact of the presence of US
troops in Central Asia. During the Cold War the deployment of American forces
in this region was completely unthinkable as it was under the absolute control of
the Soviet Union. Since 1991, Russia has seen itself as the one outside power with
a legitimate interest in the region, and this has been recognised by its inclusion in
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Central Asian states were initially reluc-
tant to accept US and allied troops on their territory in the war against the
Taleban, but in the long term some limited military contact will almost certainly
be maintained as part of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan’s resistance to the rise of
political Islam in the Ferghana valley.
The first deputy interior minister of Kyrgyzstan welcomed the presence of US
troops in his country when they were allowed to use Manas airport and suggested
that members of the coalition might have a long-term future in Kyrgyzstan, ‘if the
situation in the region deteriorates’ (Vecherny Bishkek 2001). Two hundred US
servicemen had arrived at Manas by 25 December 2001 and were preparing to
establish a more permanent base in Kyrgyzstan (Public Education Radio TV,
Bishkek 2001). The initial agreement for the US presence was for one year, but
even at that stage local commentators thought it was likely to be for longer
(Komsomolskaya Pravda v Kyrgyzstane 2002). Discussions on the establishment
of a US military presence in Kazakhstan also took place in January 2002 (Kazakh
TV 2002). Both China and Russia are concerned at this threat to their influence
and to the overall balance of power in Central Asia.
China also benefited from the ‘war on terror’ by offering its support to the
US-led coalition in return for an agreement under which the Eastern Turkistan
Islamic Movement (ETIM), which Beijing had identified in 2002 as the main
‘terrorist’ group operating in Xinjiang, would be proscribed by the international
community. It was accused of having links with al Qaeda and was blacklisted by
the US and the United Nations.
In December 2003 Beijing published the names of what it claimed were the
main Xinjiang ‘terrorist’ groups. A Statement by Zhao Yongshen of the Ministry
of Public Security listed ETIM, the Eastern Turkistan Liberation Organisation,
the World Uyghur Youth Congress and the East Turkistan Information Centre.
The last of these is based in Munich and is essentially an émigré propaganda
organisation.
Also in December 2003, China announced the death of Hasan Mehsum alias
Abu Muhammad Al-Turkestani, who was identified as the leader of ETIM and
who had apparently been shot and killed in south Waziristan, a region of Pakistan
on the border with Afghanistan on 2 October 2003. It was not made clear whether
he had been killed by Pakistani troops or by US troops in a joint operation.
Information provided by official Chinese sources about Mehsum was sketchy and