Page 60 - Conflict, Terrorism, and the Media In Asia

Indonesia: perning in the Gyre 49
has surrendered its appointed positions in the Indonesian parliament, it remains
politically influential. With mounting international concern over Islamic radicals
in the country, and the need of politicians to quieten secessionist movements, the
Indonesian military is moving back into the centre of political life.
The military is, however, an institution obsessed by security and secrecy, as two
of the key elements to waging effective war (Kasper 2001). There are also special
characteristics of the military as a profession, with its emphasis on discipline and
hierarchy and its belief in the magnitude of the potential dangers facing the com-
munity over which it stands guard (Blondel 1969). These are not characteristics that
encourage debate nor make the military conducive to an open, liberal environment.
In Indonesia, then, the ongoing influence of the military remains a concern.
Moreover, as political power has moved away from the centre post Suharto,
local politics have increased in importance and provincial administrations are
becoming increasingly reliant on the military to underpin their authority, leading
to ‘new alliances between regional commanders and regional power-holders’
(McBeth 2002a: 23). Nor is this a military that can be relied upon to act in a pro-
fessional manner. When the IMF and the World Bank forced the military to open
its books ‘a crack’, they saw an organisation running low on funding and relying
on its own resources for half its annual spending. While the military has legal
enterprises, many of these are struggling, forcing it to turn increasingly to illegal
activities to finance its operations: ‘it’s a political lobbying group and a business
conglomerate with links to organised crime. Don’t look at it as an institution, but
as a lobby group of individuals seeking tribute and money’ (McBeth 2002b: 14).

Megawati and the military

While the fall of Suharto and the loss of East Timor marked a decline in the military’s
reputation and status, it was President Megawati who marked its return to favour as
she looked for support as her popularity waned. As a result, Indonesia’s press free-
dom does not extend to its conflict areas. The media has been unable to cover the con-
flicts from Maluku to Aceh, impartially. Threats to the safety of journalists from the
parties to the conflicts were the main deterrent, and physical attacks on journalists
generally went unpunished (Asian Media and Communication Bulletin 2002: 12).
The Indonesian authorities have tried to block the media’s access to areas of
civil conflict, and anti-government rebels also put pressure on journalists to get
their side of the story out. Megawati gave the military hardliners a free hand in
Aceh (something her successor does not seem inclined to reverse). The declara-
tion of martial law there in May 2003 allowed the military to impose harsh
restrictions on the press and effectively silence journalists trying to cover the war
against the rebels of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka – GAM).
The Indonesian army did everything possible to keep the news media away from
Aceh, where it resumed the war against the separatists. Human Rights Watch
documented dozens of arrests, physical attacks and threats against journalists
(Human Rights Watch 2003). Two reporters were killed in the rebel zone and
dozens of others were physically attacked or threatened.