Page 61 - Conflict, Terrorism, and the Media In Asia

50 Jonathan Woodier
Criticism of the ‘dirty war’ in Aceh in respected publications such as Kompas
and Tempo met with disapproval from both the authorities and other media, espe-
cially the broadcast media, which took a position of support for the war against
the GAM ‘terrorists’. The central government in Jakarta cautioned the media
against any lack of nationalism and failure to support the security forces. By June
2003, the military had achieved a virtual lock down of Aceh, and the army
announced that the foreign ministry had given orders for all foreign and national
journalists working for international news media to leave the province (Reporters
Without Borders 2004). This influence spread to the newsrooms of Indonesia’s
media: Dandhy Dwi Laksono of the independent television channel SCTV was
fired in June 2003 as a result of pressure from the army, which objected to a
report on torture in Aceh during the 1990s. Laksono told Human Rights Watch
that his editors had made no attempt to resist the army’s pressure and had
described him as an ‘anti-military journalist’ (Human Rights Watch 2003).
The media has not played the Aceh conflict as a part of the war on terror nor
has it been sympathetic to GAM’s arguments – a fact that is reflected in attempts
by GAM to pressure reporters covering the conflict. Media criticism of the gov-
ernment purely focused on the abuses perpetrated by the military in its conduct
of the war and has not given wider support for the GAM cause (Jakarta Post.com
2005). The Aceh conflict has always been portrayed as a separatist movement, and
this works better in a nationalistic Indonesia, and GAM frustration with this has
been marked by violence against journalists and local media organisations.
However, it should be noted that since the ‘war on ‘terror’, the West has already
shown itself eager to support Jakarta’s efforts to quell legally separatist movements,
and three Achenese leaders in Sweden were arrested on suspicion of violating
international laws. Indonesia, which supplied information to Sweden, claimed to
have intercepted email and satellite-phone traffic ordering acts of terrorism from
forces in Aceh. The three were at the forefront of peace talks that broke down in
April 2003, unleashing a year-long military campaign against GAM fighters in
Aceh (McBeth and Lintner 2004: 21).
Thus, although the army lost its 38 non-elected seats in the People’s
Consultative Assembly in 2004, the military is still understood to be the most
important institution in the country, and it is still the army that intervenes in reli-
gious and ethnic conflicts. With separatist rebellions and the outbreaks of social
unrest which have become commonplace since the end of authoritarian rule, there
is a new obsession with preserving the unitary state that made bedfellows of the
nationalist-minded President Megawati Sukarnoputri and military conservatives
like army chief General Ryamizard Ryacadu and Army Strategic Reserve com-
mander Lt General Bibit Walayu, who want to retain influence over Indonesia’s
thirty-two provinces (McBeth 2002a: 23).
The new president, with similar internal concerns as well as a desire to please
Western allies by silencing radical Islamic opposition, could further reinforce
the military’s central role in Indonesian society. Yudhoyono is equally aware
of the importance of the Indonesian military, the TNI. On his election as president,
he replaced TNI chief General Endriartono Sutarto, who had been appointed by
Megawatti, with Army chief General Ryamizard Ryacudu, after Endriartono had