Page 87 - Conflict, Terrorism, and the Media In Asia

76 Benjamin Cole
society groups, told the Manila Bulletin that the Moro people were tired of the
ASG, because they were suffering persecution, oppression and discrimination due
to its ‘hijacking’ of Islam and its values of tolerance, co-existence, justice,
fairness, sincerity and honesty (Manila Bulletin 2004c). Regular reporting of the
displacement and killing of civilians in battles with the AFP focuses popular dis-
content on the negative impact that the ASG is having on the Muslim community,
and has effectively isolated the ASG (Gloria 2000). Unlike the MILF and the
CPP-NPA, the ASG has not shown any ability to develop and adapt its relations
with the media or to influence media outputs. As a consequence, the nature
of the reporting of the ASG still largely reflects the shortcomings that were
highlighted in 2000.

The military and the media: hyping
the terror threat
One of the main criticisms of the Filipino media’s reporting of these conflicts in
2000 was the way it used briefings from official sources. The media’s handling of
official sources has improved since then, but the majority of reporting still tends
to be skewed in favour of official sources. On the face of it this perpetuates the
primary role of media as an agent of stability. The situation is complicated by the
existence of divisions within the government and the security forces over how to
deal with these conflicts. As a result, political turf battles are frequently played
out in the media. Elements of the military favour a more hard line military
approach than President Arroyo and are in a powerful position to influence media
outputs through briefings on operational issues. The MILF in particular has com-
plained about AFP misinformation in the media, and the Filipino media has been
unable to avoid being dragged into these political turf battles. Therefore sections
of the administration are attempting to use the media as an agent of change, in
respect of government policy.
These political turf battles were evident when the MILF proposed a temporary
ceasefire in 2003. Arroyo welcomed it as a positive development, but Defence
Secretary Angelo Reyes rejected it on the grounds that the MILF could use it to
regroup. Major General Roy Kyamko, head of the army’s Southern Command,
also saw the ceasefire declaration as a tactical move that had been forced upon
the MILF by heavy losses. Unlike Arroyo, they preferred to continue military
operations to achieve a military victory (Inq7.net 2003d). It is indicative of the
power of the Military that it feels able to use the media to challenge the President
in this way. The problem for Arroyo is that she is politically indebted to the AFP
and is fearful of suffering the same fate as former President Estrada, who was
forced from office in 2001 after the AFP withdrew its support (Trillanes 2001).
The main way in which these elements of the AFP attempt to undermine the
peace process with the MILF and force a change in government policy is to per-
sistently brief the media with intelligence reports about actual and alleged links
between the MILF, JI, the ASG and the Pentagon gang, often implying that these
links are institutional in nature. But it is often difficult to distinguish one group