Page 90 - Conflict, Terrorism, and the Media In Asia

The Philippines media 79
Despite this, Arroyo’s approach to dealing with the Philippines’ indigenous
conflicts often does not fit neatly into US policy in the ‘war on terror’. The US
seeks to highlight links between al Qaeda and local groups throughout Asia in
order to build a picture of a regional and global terror threat. It is these actual and
perceived links to al Qaeda that underpin a US policy towards the various conflicts
in the Philippines that borders on interventionism and at times brings it into con-
flict with the Filipino government. The US has attempted to use the media to exert
public pressure on Arroyo to pursue a more hard line policy that fits with its vision
of the ‘war on terror’. The US embassy in Manila regularly briefs the Filipino
media on how the conflicts in the Philippines fit into the ‘war on terror’. One of
the ways it does this is to hype-up the al Qaeda threat in the Philippines. In 2004
for instance, US Ambassador, Francis Ricciardone, issued a statement that JI train-
ing camps in the Philippines posed a danger not just to Southeast Asia but to the
world at large (Manila Bulletin 2004d), and US defense officials also briefed jour-
nalists that JI had become the biggest terrorist threat to the Philippines (Mindanao
Daily Mirror 2005g). Yet JI perpetrates fewer violent attacks in the Philippines
than any other combatant group currently operating in the country and is not
known to have been involved in any attacks outside Southeast Asia.
The US also attempts to link indigenous Filipino groups with JI in order to
bring them all within the ambit of the ‘war on terror’, even though it accepts that
it is ‘rogue factions’ within the MILF and MNLF which have links to terrorism
(Mindanao Daily Mirror 2005g). In 2004 for instance, Ricciardone questioned
MILF denials that it shelters foreign militants, as well as the sincerity of its offer
to help the government fight JI (Manila Bulletin 2004d). The following year he
expressed doubts about the sincerity of the MILF to resume peace talks and sug-
gested that the MILF should rid itself of members who were alleged to be con-
nected with JI: ‘The United States is confused with the MILF. Are they people
who welcome terrorist bombers from the Jemaah Islamiyah? Are they killers who
bomb markets or otherwise? They have to make their position clear’ (Manila
Bulletin 2005b). This contrasts markedly with the views of the Filipino govern-
ment, as expressed by Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, who stated that
the government trusts the MILF leadership (Manila Bulletin 2005b; Mindanao
Daily Mirror 2005f), and Eduardo Ermita, a presidential adviser on the peace
talks with the MILF, who has stated that al Qaeda has no contacts in the
Philippines apart from with the ASG (Suh 2001).
The statements issued by the US Embassy in Manila often reflect more deep
seated concerns in Washington about the Philippines’ handling of the ‘war on ter-
ror’, which are also reported back in the Philippines. In a particularly damaging
instance in 2004, the Manila Times reported on a story from the New York Times
that the Filipino government had received a diplomatic reproach from
Washington for not doing enough to root out terrorist groups. A Western diplo-
mat suggested to the New York Times that Manila had been ‘in a state of denial’
about the terrorist threat, following a US assessment that an alliance had formed
between JI, the ASG and the MILF (Manila Times 2004b). This assessment com-
pletely misrepresents the nature of the links between these three groups and gives