Page 88 - Conflict, Terrorism, and the Media In Asia

The Philippines media 77
from another when they all operate in the same geographical area and many of
them are related to each other, either by kinship or erstwhile comradeship
(Rimban 2003). After a kidnapping incident by the ASG on the island of Sipadan
in 2000, police and military intelligence agents drafted separate internal briefs
suggesting that the incident was the spark for a united front of ‘Islamic extrem-
ists’ in the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. This assessment proved to be
wrong, and could be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to hype up the threat in
order to justify increased military action (Gloria 2000).
The AFP has also influenced media outputs through its assessment of
responsibility for terrorist incidents. Its attempts to manipulate these assessments
have led to a number of public fiascos. The most notable was the bomb attack on
Davao City airport in March 2003, which was initially claimed by the ASG in a
telephone interview with ABS-CBN. Almost immediately the Defence Secretary
Angelo T. Reyes dismissed the claim on the grounds that the ASG does not oper-
ate in Davao (Manila Times 2003b). The MILF denied involvement but a number
of its senior commanders were subsequently accused of the bombing. The charges
threatened to de-rail the peace process until they were finally withdrawn in 2004
due to a lack of evidence. The media was justifiably critical of the government’s
handling of this incident. The Manila Times argued that it had given the MILF the
upper hand in the propaganda war, because it could be used as proof that the MILF
was not linked to terrorism, and also displayed a lack of sincerity on the part of
the government in the peace process (Manila Times 2004d).
The AFP finds a receptive audience for these messages amongst those tabloids
which label the MILF as a terrorist organisation, and favour a military response
to the conflict. But there are serious concerns that even the broadsheet press rely
too heavily on AFP and PNP briefings, often reporting them verbatim, even when
their contents cannot be verified. The inability or unwillingness of the media to
analyse or caveat the briefings that it receives from official sources is a serious
deficiency, although the media does give the MILF the opportunity to comment
on some of these briefings. In 2004 for instance, when the Sun Star Davao
reported comments by Ebrahim Murad that there would be no peace with Manila
if sections of the military continued to make allegations that the MILF sheltered
JI militants, he suggested that ‘frankly, we feel there are people in government
who don’t want peace in Mindanao’ (Sun Star Davao 2004c). But merely report-
ing these claims and counter-claims does not clarify the situation and is not a real
substitute for thorough and independent analysis of the issues.
Nevertheless, there have been encouraging signs that some sections of the
media oppose the change to more hardline military solutions and are increasingly
taking on the role of an agent of restraint, notably the internet news site Inq7.net.
Following a massive military assault on the MILF in February 2003, Inq7.net
attacked the influence of ‘hawks’ in the AFP and the administration. The AFP had
initially justified the assault by claiming that the MILF was harbouring members
of the Pentagon Gang but subsequently admitted that the real target was the MILF
itself. The rationale was an allegation that it was massing its forces in violation of
the ceasefire, but there are other political mechanisms to address such problems.