Page 21 - Contemporary Cultural Theory
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UTILITARIANISM

            which remains even half-committed to any notion of traditional cultural
            value such as is typically sustained by the churches, the education
            system, and so on. Thus, in practice, the Humean impasse recurs
            indefinitely. And it does so, we should note, for reasons that are not
            so much logical as sociological.
              The logic of a consistently Benthamite position is impeded by a set
            of obstructions which are sociological in a double sense: first, by
            those practical social necessities which inhibit any respectable, middle-
            class intelligentsia from siding with the pornographer against the pulpit;
            and second, by the properly theoretical, but not in the philosopher’s
            sense of the term strictly logical, objections which the discipline of
            sociology itself raises against utilitarianism. The doyen of American
            sociology, Talcott Parsons, summarized the central sociological case
            against utilitarianism as early as 1937. Parsons observed that
            utilitarianism could be considered a type of “action theory”, and
            that, like all such theories, its basic units are the actor; the end towards
            which the action is oriented; the situation in which the action takes
            place; and the “normative orientation” of action, that is, the particular
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            mode of relationship between the other elements in the action.  The
            peculiarity of the utilitarian schema, Parsons continued, is that it
            tends, first, to ignore the relation of ends to each other or, when they
            are so considered, “to lay emphasis on their diversity and lack of
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            integration”;  and second, to assume as the normative orientation of
            the means—end relationship in the unit act, “an overwhelming stress
            upon one particular type, which may be called the ‘rational norm of
            efficiency’”. 34
              In short, utilitarianism proceeds as if people’s goals were random,
            and their ways of knowing the world, and so of identifying those
            goals, essentially indistinguishable from those of rational-scientific
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            knowledge.  But in reality, human goals are not at all random: they
            are very clearly structured, or patterned. In reality, human actors
            know the world in ways other than that of positive science: their
            goals are patterned as much by systems of religious, political, ethical
            and aesthetic value as by any kind of cognitive knowledge, scientific
            or otherwise. The theory of possessive individualism is thus revealed
            as far less obviously grounded in social fact than Macpherson would
            later suppose. And in classical European sociology, and more especially
            in the work of Vilfredo Pareto and Emile Durkheim (but also in that
            of Alfred Marshall, the utilitarian economist), there develops a growing


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