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152  Citizenship



                        activists. This represents a significant shift on the part of the second - wave
                        feminist movement which, unlike that of the nineteenth century, was
                        rather suspicious of the state. Second - wave feminism was dominated by
                        socialist and radical feminists who have tended to see the state in func-
                        tionalist terms as reproductive of capitalism and patriarchy, and who have
                        preferred to direct their activities elsewhere. In many respects, this strategy
                        has proved very fruitful. The success of the slogan  “ the personal is politi-
                        cal ”  is indicative of the politicizing of subjectivity and personal relations,
                        for example, and many of the institutions set up by the movement, such
                        as the centers dealing with rape and domestic violence, have had a signifi -
                        cant impact on perceptions and practices. Arguably, as we saw in chapter
                          3 , these forms of politics are as important to women ’ s citizenship as
                        formal rights to political participation. It has, of course, also been the
                        case that some second - wave feminists have been engaged with issues of
                        law and public policy, often working through trade unions in Europe,
                        or through interest groups such as the National Organization for Women
                        in the US. It is, however, relatively recently that the issue of women ’ s
                        representation as such has been raised.
                            The discussion of political rights for women, however, exemplifi es
                        another prominent dilemma in recent feminist thought and action, that
                        raised by the issue of essentialism. It is useful to distinguish two different
                        types of essentialism used in this debate. Following Diana Fuss  (1989) ,

                        the fi rst may be identified as  “ real essentialism. ”  Derived from Aristotle,
                        it indicates that the essence of something or someone is what is irreducible
                        and unchangeable about it or them. It is also the most common use of
                        the term in feminist theory. It is used to describe the belief that women
                        are intrinsically and unalterably different from men. The most obvious
                        difference in this respect is in reproductive capacities and there is consid-
                        erable discussion concerning the intrinsic importance of this aspect of
                        sexual difference. However, the term is also applied  –  pejoratively  –  to
                        those who agree with Carol Gilligan  (1993)  that women have a  “ different

                        voice ”  from men in relation to moral issues: context specific and relation-
                        ship oriented rather than based on adherence to universal moral principles.
                        The second use Fuss calls  “ nominal essentialism. ”  The essence of someone
                        or something here consists in what remains the same across the different
                        uses of a term, a classification made in language. She argues that social

                        constructionists, those who take as their starting point the view that there
                        are no intrinsic, fundamental differences between women and men, may
                        be nominal essentialists where they focus on historically and socially

                        specific differences between the sexes, on  “ the production and organiza-
                        tion of differences ”  (Fuss,  1989 : 2). In relation to reproductive capacities,
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