Page 165 - Critical Political Economy of the Media

144 Critical investigations in political economy

marketers’ demands, not simply to consumer/user demands (as those who
equate ‘free markets’ with consumer sovereignty, or media provision with popular
demand assume; see Gitlin 1997; Meehan 2005). Commercial media do not give
the people what they want; they give what is profitable to provide. Further, they
give what the advertising system will support. This classic critique is relevant for
‘free’ ad-financed social media whose economic model has affinities with FTA
commercial television. The critique needs updating, however, as what is pro-
vided is not content so much as services or software for user communication and
(co)creation.

Advertising influence and media

To fully understand media we need to understand how media content and services
are financed and paid for. A rich tradition of CPE work on media finance and
advertising shares with mainstream media economics a concern to examine the
resources for media firms, matters of growing importance and complexity given
the proliferation of modes of delivery and consumption of digital content.
However, CPE analysis goes beyond a narrow concern with profitability or
promotional effectiveness, to consider the spectrum of advertising influence. The
first question to ask is the level of economic dependence by media on advertising
finance. We can ask this question historically to trace the development of com-
mercial mass media, and ask it in relation to media sectors, businesses, types of
products and specific media vehicles. In broad outline, revenues from advertising
represent 50–60 per cent for magazines, up to 80 per cent for newspapers and
100 per cent for FTA commercial radio and television (Bagdikian 2004: 230;
Bettig and Hall 2012).
Media dependence on advertising can be exploited by advertisers to secure
favourable conditions such as discounted pricing. However, advertisers can also
intervene to influence editorial content, as Chrysler did when it requested that
magazine editors notified the car manufacturer of editorial matter adjacent to its
adverts that it deemed detrimental to sales (Soley 2002: 210–11). In this instance
the American Society of Magazine Editors rallied successfully against a crude
demand for censorship, but Soley surveys numerous advertiser efforts to censor
media. Bagdikian (2004) documents how tobacco companies used their influence
as heavy advertisers to curtail media discussion of the health effects of smoking.
Procter and Gamble prohibited programmes ‘which could in any way further
the concept of business as cold, ruthless, and lacking all sentiment or spiritual
motivation’ (cited in Herman and McChesney 1997: 7).

Instrumentalist and structuralist explanations
There have been debates between two main alternative explanations of
advertiser influence. Instrumentalist explanations focus on the intentional
actions and behaviour of actors in seeking to control communications. These