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Class, identity and culture  67

                        While there are therefore some potential riders that need to be placed
                   on an overenthusiastic endorsement of Bourdieu’s account, it does provide
                   new and alternative ways of thinking of class, culture and identity. I will offer
                   some other potential issues later. However, it is worth considering further one
                   specific study that Devine and Savage locate in this framework. Anthias (2005)
                   considers what she terms the  ‘intersectionality’ model of social divisions,
                   where ‘forms of inequality and subordination are distinctive yet interlocking’
                   (p. 36). While this might be contentious for older forms of class analysis or
                   what she terms the ‘reductionist’ model, there is, in my mind, not much to
                   dispute here. This can in many respects, I would argue, be taken as a safe
                   ground. However, as Anthias suggests, it is important to move this sort of
                   account from the descriptive to the more theoretical. She does this via a dis-
                   cussion of the  ‘identity’ model. This has been an increasingly common
                   account and the approach that I have considered so far in this chapter has
                   made much of the idea of identity as has been set out. Anthias mounts a
                   critique of what I would see as some forms of this sort of approach. Indeed she
                   makes two potentionally important criticisms of this idea:
                        First, the concept has been expanded so much that it has lost its speci-
                        ficity, so it can embrace everything, for example, when shifting or mul-
                        tiple notions are used to correct the essentialising of earlier concepts.
                        Secondly, the concept always takes us back to the theoretical baggage
                        about communal identity as generic and fundamental in social processes.
                        Whilst acknowledging that people’s notions of belonging are important
                        social facts, we cannot presuppose that they are always necessary or
                        determining elements in collective placement or action.
                                                                     (Anthias 2005: 39)
                        While, on the face of it, these are potentially significant points, it is
                   not clear that they represent a critique of the concept of identity itself, rather
                   than of particular uses of it and the slippages that are involved. That is to say
                   this is not a necessary implication of the concept itself. This seems to be the
                   case when the important way in which she develops her argument is con-
                   sidered. This involves attention to ideas of belonging. ‘“Where do I belong?” is
                   a recurrent thought, however, for most of us. Asking this question is usually
                   prompted by a feeling that there are a range of spaces, places, locales and
                   identities that we do not and cannot belong to’ (Anthias 2005: 39). Thus in
                   rejecting a form of identity approach it is possible to retain an emphasis on the
                   issues that a sociological attention to processes of identity suggest and to
                   divorce this attention from particular modes of identity politics. Thus, Anthias
                   proposes that focus should fall on ‘narratives of location’ and positionality: ‘A
                   narrative is an account that tells a story and a narrative of location, as it is used
                   here, is an account that tells a story about how we place ourselves in terms
                   of social categories, such as those of gender, ethnicity and class at a specific
                   point in time and space’ (p. 42). It is further important to recognize that such
                   narratives involve  ‘a rejection of what one is not rather than a clear and
                   unambiguous formulation of what one is’ (p. 43). These are points that inform
                   the idea of elective belonging and, moreover, some of the other arguments of
                   this book, as:
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