Page 79 - Cultural Change and Ordinary Life
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70  Cultural change and ordinary life

                     inscription works, Skeggs argues that she is able to see ‘the way that value
                     is transferred onto bodies and read off them and the mechanisms by which
                     it is retained, accumulated, lost or appropriated’ (p.13). This involves a
                     wider understanding of the idea of exchange in the context of the sort of
                     consideration of Bourdieu outlined earlier.
                          Skeggs develops an extended analysis of how concepts like exchange and
                     market have developed historically. The detail of this discussion is outwith the
                     specific concerns of this book. However, it is important to note that her analy-
                     sis shows first that such terms are not ‘neutral’, that is they are not free from
                     social context and social content, but moreover they are performative in the
                     sense already considered earlier in this book. That is they bring into existence
                     that which they name through the act (performance) of speaking (for an audi-
                     ence). Moreover, in Skeggs’ analysis such processes are those that mark class,
                     even if class is not directly named. ‘When we come across the terms economic,
                     social body, exchange, market, self, interest, rational action, abstract space,
                     etc., we need to think about how they articulate a specific relationship to class.
                     Such terms may appear to have nothing to do with class, but they constitute it
                     nonetheless, primarily through their reiteration of value on a daily basis’
                     (Skeggs 2004: 44). Having therefore set out some of the key aspects of Skeggs’
                     analysis, in a fairly brisk fashion, I now turn to the most important part of her
                     analysis for my approach, which is the discussion of identity and self.
                          In broad terms, Skeggs seeks to show how some theories that emphasize
                     the power of a mobile self or the ability to remake the self, tend to lack ‘a
                     theory of positioning, a way of understanding how birth into categorizations,
                     known and recognized through inscription, representations, discourse and
                     narrative, but also institutionalized and surveilled, sets limits on the potential
                     for exchange (whether it be through the labour theory of value, renting, asset
                     accrual, or conversion of cultural capital)’ (2004: 77). Thus, the mobility of the
                     self is more limited for some people than others. Again, there are many dimen-
                     sions to this discussion that could be explored, but I focus on the idea that the
                     contemporary self is prosthetic.
                          Skeggs develops this argument from previous ideas that the self has been
                     aestheticized. Thus, identity, especially for middle-class people, is produced
                     through the expansion of a range of cultural forms engaged with (see further
                     Chapter 8) and through the development of the self as an artistic pursuit
                     through style and so on. Skeggs suggests that such views are based on the idea
                     that self ‘accrues’ culture, thus having similarities to the view discussed in
                     Chapter 9 of the extended self, produced through enthusiasm. However, as
                     in that discussion, Skeggs argues that the idea of the prosthetic self is different
                     in that it entails play with new forms and ideas (they can be taken on and taken
                     off) and that such theories are ‘predicated upon a critique of how certain per-
                     spectives become legitimated’ (p. 137). This idea of prosthetic extension is
                     therefore useful in thinking the idea of the self further.
                          Skeggs derives this idea from the work of Lury (1998) in particular. The
                     argument is that the:
                          [T]rying on, or attachment of and detachment of cultural resources
                          (which she defines as either perceptual or mechanical) makes this
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