Page 80 - Cultural Change and Ordinary Life

Class, identity and culture 71

self-extension possible. In adopting/adapting/attaching a prosthesis, the
person creates (or is created by) a self-identity that is no longer defined
by the edict ‘I think therefore I am’; rather, he or she is constituted in the
relation ‘I can, therefore I am’. Access to resources is therefore central to
this ‘doing’, experimental self.
(Skeggs 2004: 138–9)
Also important is knowledge. Perhaps even more significant is the idea
that the extension via the prosthesis involves a performance, which Skeggs
develops through the work of Munro (1996) and Strathern (1991, 1992). As I
will argue further, with respect to the literature on fandom and enthusiasm in
Chapter 9, this is a powerful idea. Skeggs makes the important point that the
resources available for this process are unevenly distributed. This is an import-
ant point and she also shows how ideas of the self considered in the omnivore
thesis (see Chapter 8) imply less playfulness (p. 147).
This discussion has made the important point that these ideas of the self
involve connection to a variety of resources and that the working class may be
disadvantaged in this. However, while this is no doubt true, I will argue that
there are also alternative resources that are available to these groups. This may
mean that their selves are extended in different ways. It is here that ideas of the
different, not just unequal, resources are important. Moreover, if many of these
resources are provided via a media-drenched society, then they are perhaps
more widely available than Skeggs suggests.
Another related issue with this idea of the prosthetic self is that, as I have
suggested earlier with respect to the work of Bourdieu, it can seem as this is a
voluntaristic process, in that people can decide whether or not to engage in
such processes. While there will of course be aspects of the process that are like
this, it is not a free choice by any means. Despite these points, there is much to
be gained via these ideas of the self and I will take them up at several points
subsequently. However, I now turn to some related issues of class, culture and
morality.

Morality, evaluation and ordinary life
In his book The Moral Significance of Class, Sayer (2005) explores a number of
important issues in the cultural examination of class. I will not consider all the
significant issues that he raises and I do not dwell overly on the theoretical
project of his work. In this respect his conjunction of political economy and
sociology is both original and thought-provoking. However, it is relatively
removed from the specific concerns of my argument. Moreover, I am unable to
explore the detail of many of his overall themes. The full discussion of these
would take more space than is available here. I therefore seek to draw from his
argument some important points that further the approach that I am develop-
ing. Thus, in further grounding the aspect of the cultural significance of class
in mediatized ordinary life, I mobilize four main aspects of Sayer’s argument.
First, I rather briefly consider the overall thrust of his argument. Second, I
consider aspects of his revision of Bourdieu’s idea of the habitus. Third, I
extend this examination through the way in which he considers aspects of the