Page 194 - Cultural Theory and Popular Culture an Introduction

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178 Chapter 8 ‘Race’, racism and representation

campaign], while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue
whose merits are hotly disputed, is not pretty’ (quoted in Martin, 1993: 19–20). This
makes very unconvincing Bush’s claim that the United States fought the war with one
hand tied behind its back.
A second example of the consumption of Hollywood’s Vietnam is provided by the
comments of American Vietnam veterans. As Marita Sturken observes, ‘Some Vietnam
veterans say they have forgotten where some of their memories came from – their own
experiences, documentary photographs, or Hollywood movies?’ (1997: 20). For example,
Vietnam veteran William Adams makes this telling point:

When Platoon was first released, a number of people asked me, ‘Was the war really
like that?’ I never found an answer, in part because, no matter how graphic and
realistic, a movie is after all a movie, and war is only like itself. But I also failed to find
an answer because what ‘really’ happened is now so thoroughly mixed up in my
mind with what has been said about what happened that the pure experience is no
longer there. This is odd, even painful, in some ways. But it is also testimony to the
way our memories work. The Vietnam War is no longer a definite event so much
as it is a collective and mobile script in which we continue to scrawl, erase, rewrite
our conflicting and changing view of ourselves (quoted in Sturken, 1997: 86).

Similarly, academic and Vietnam veteran Michael Clark writes of how the ticker-tape
welcome home parade for Vietnam veterans staged in New York in 1985, together with
the media coverage of the parade and the Hollywood films which seemed to provide
the context for the parade, had worked together to produce a particular memory of the
war – a memory with potentially deadly effects:

they had constituted our memory of the war all along . . . [They] healed over the
wounds that had refused to close for ten years with a balm of nostalgia, and trans-
formed guilt and doubt into duty and pride. And with a triumphant flourish [they]
offered us the spectacle of [their] most successful creation, the veterans who will
fight the next war (Clark, 1991: 180).

Moreover, as Clark is at pains to stress, ‘the memory of Vietnam has ceased to be a
point of resistance to imperialist ambitions and is now invoked as a vivid warning to
do it right next time’ (206). These concerns were fully justified by Bush’s triumphalism
as the end of the first Gulf War, when he boasted, as if the war had been fought for no
other reason than to overcome a traumatic memory, ‘By God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam
Syndrome once and for all’ (quoted in Franklin, 1993: 177). Echoing these comments,
the New York Times (2 December 1993) featured an article with the title, ‘Is the Vietnam
Syndrome Dead? Happily, It’s Buried in the Gulf’. Vietnam, the sign of American loss
and division had been buried in the sands of the Persian Gulf. Kicking the Vietnam
Syndrome (with the help of Hollywood’s Vietnam) had supposedly liberated a nation
from old ghosts and doubts; had made America once again strong, whole and ready for
the next war.