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Anti-racism and cultural studies 179

Anti-racism and cultural studies

As was noted with both feminist and Marxist approaches to popular culture, discus-
sions of ‘race’ and representation inevitably, and quite rightly, involve an ethical imper-
ative to condemn the deeply inhuman discourses of racism. With this in mind, I want
to end this section with two quotations, followed by a brief discussion and another
quotation. The first quotation is from Stuart Hall and the second from Paul Gilroy.

[T]he work that cultural studies has to do is to mobilise everything that it can find
in terms of intellectual resources in order to understand what keeps making the
lives we live, and the societies we live in, profoundly and deeply antihumane in
their capacity to live with difference. Cultural studies’ message is a message for aca-
demics and intellectuals but, fortunately, for many other people as well. ...I am
convinced that no intellectual worth his or her salt, and no university that wants
to hold up its head in the face of the twenty-first century, can afford to turn dis-
passionate eyes away from the problems of race and ethnicity that beset our world
(Hall, 1996e: 343).
We need to know what sorts of insight and reflection might actually help increas-
ingly differentiated societies and anxious individuals to cope successfully with the
challenges involved in dwelling comfortably in proximity to the unfamiliar with-
out becoming fearful and hostile. We need to consider whether the scale upon
which sameness and difference are calculated might be altered productively so that
the strangeness of strangers goes out of focus and other dimensions of basic same-
ness can be acknowledged and made significant. We also need to consider how a
deliberate engagement with the twentieth century’s history of suffering might fur-
nish resources for the peaceful accommodation of otherness in relation to funda-
mental commonality. . . . [That is,] namely that human beings are ordinarily far
more alike than they are unalike, that most of the time we can communicate with
each other, and that the recognition of mutual worth, dignity, and essential sim-
ilarity imposes restrictions on how we can behave if we wish to act justly (Gilroy
2004: 3–4).

The work of cultural studies, like that of all reasonable intellectual traditions, is to
intellectually, and by example, help to defeat racism, and by so doing, help to bring
into being a world in which the term ‘race’ is little more than a long disused historical
category, signifying in the contemporary nothing more than the human race. However,
as Gilroy observed in 1987, and, unfortunately, still the case more than twenty years
later, until that moment arrives,

‘Race’ must be retained as an analytic category not because it corresponds to any
biological or epistemological absolutes, but because it refers investigation to the
power that collective identities acquire by means of their roots in tradition. These