Page 193 - Cultural Theory and Popular Culture an Introduction

CULT_C08.qxd 10/24/08 17:24 Page 177

Orientalism 177

called the ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ (1986). The debate over American foreign policy had,
according to Nixon, been ‘grotesquely distorted’ by reluctance ‘to use power to defend
national interests’ (13). Fear of another Vietnam, had made America ‘ashamed of . . .
[its] power, guilty about being strong’ (19).
In the two Bush speeches from which I have quoted, and in many other similar
speeches, Bush was articulating what many powerful American voices throughout the
1980s had sought to make the dominant meaning of the war: ‘the Vietnam War as a
noble cause betrayed – an American tragedy’. For example, in the 1980 presidential cam-
paign Ronald Reagan declared, in an attempt to put an end to the Vietnam Syndrome,
‘It is time we recognized that ours was, in truth, a noble cause’ (quoted in John Carlos
Rowe and Rick Berg, 1991: 10). Moreover, Reagan insisted, ‘Let us tell those who
fought in that war that we will never again ask young men to fight and possibly die in
a war our government is afraid to let us win’ (quoted in Stephen Vlastos, 1991: 69). In
1982 (almost a decade after the last US combat troops left Vietnam), the Vietnam
Veterans’ memorial was unveiled in Washington. Reagan observed that Americans were
‘beginning to appreciate that [the Vietnam War] was a just cause’ (quoted in Barbie
Zelizer, 1995: 220). In 1984 (eleven years after the last US combat troops left Vietnam)
the Unknown Vietnam Soldier was buried; at the ceremony President Reagan claimed,
‘An American hero has returned home. . . . He accepted his mission and did his duty.
And his honest patriotism overwhelms us’ (quoted in Rowe and Berg, 1991: 10). In
1985 (twelve years after the last US combat troops left Vietnam), New York staged
the first of the ‘Welcome Home’ parades for Vietnam veterans. In this powerful mix
of political rhetoric and national remembering, there is a clear attempt to put in place
a new ‘consensus’ about the meaning of America’s war in Vietnam. It begins in 1980
in Reagan’s successful presidential campaign and ends in 1991 with the triumphalism
of Bush after victory in the first Gulf War. Therefore, when, in the build-up to the
Gulf War, Bush had asked Americans to remember the Vietnam War, the memories
recalled by many Americans may have been of a war they had lived cinematically; a
war of bravery and betrayal. Hollywood’s Vietnam had provided the materials to
rehearse, elaborate, interpret and retell an increasingly dominant memory of America’s
war in Vietnam.
This was a memory that had little relationship to the ‘facts’ of the war. Put simply,
the United States deployed in Vietnam the most intensive firepower the world had ever
witnessed. Hollywood narratives do not feature the deliberate defoliation of large areas
of Vietnam, the napalm strikes, the search-and-destroy missions, the use of Free Fire
Zones, the mass bombing. For example, during the ‘Christmas bombing’ campaign of
1972, the United States ‘dropped more tonnage of bombs on Hanoi and Haiphong
than Germany dropped on Great Britain from 1940 to 1945’ (Franklin, 1993: 79). In
total, the United States dropped three times the number of bombs on Vietnam as had
been dropped anywhere during the whole of the Second World War (Pilger, 1990). In
a memorandum to President Johnson in 1967, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
wrote: ‘[The] picture of the world’s greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring
1,000 noncombatants a week [his estimate of the human cost of the US bombing