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33  “What Is Ours and What Is Not Ours?”                        401

              I am not generalising that this case represents an attribute of all mathematics
            teacher educators who have been oriented according to your narrow foundation-
            alism. But this encounter suggests that the non-sceptical posture embedded in
            the foundation of mathematics education does not help mathematics teachers and
            teacher  educators  go  beyond  the  narrow  structural  boundary  of  mathematical
            knowledge (Hersh 1997). Here, the notion of narrow structural boundary means the
            unhelpful myth that mathematics is always structured in a singular, objective and
            incorrigible way. How can you expect innovation if you educate teachers to be mute
            followers? Thus, I argue that healthy scepticism helps mathematics teachers renew
            their pedagogical praxis and knowledge about mathematics.
              You may raise a question here: Which version of scepticism do I want to promote
            in mathematics teacher education programs? In my mind, scepticism (or doubt) and
            belief presuppose each other, for there is no scepticism or doubt where there is no
            belief. Perhaps a healthy scepticism is an expression generated through dialectical
            relationships between believing and being sceptical at the same time (Bell 2005).
                                                                          7
            With the help of dialectical thinking, I prefer to promote a “middle way”  that
            neither rejects foundationalism totally nor prevents prospective teachers from ques-
            tioning the so-called indubitable foundation of mathematics education. How can
            your logical and psychological foundations fit within my vision? As far as the logical
            aspect (e.g., Kuroda 1958) of the foundation is concerned, prospective teachers
            and teacher educators will be able to realise the limitations of conventional logics
            (e.g., propositional, deductive and analytical) and the linear hierarchical structure
            (of mathematics)  embedded in mathematics education. And, there are possibili-
                          8
            ties that your conventional logical structure of mathematics can be modified and
            adapted together with emergent structures arising from knowledge systems embed-
            ded in local cultural practices.
              Dear Dr. Authority, it seems to me that another key element of your foundation
            is behaviourism, which promotes a mechanical view of learning as a linear combi-
            nation  of  stimulus  and  response.  An  immediate  implication  of  this  school  of
            thought in mathematics education is that learning is possible only through repeti-
            tion, practice and drill (Hilgard and Bower 1977). Do you really believe that the
            phenomenon of learning can be explained only this way? Here, I am hinting at yet
            another possible “foundation” that promotes largely cognitive approaches, which
            regard  learning  as  an  exclusively  mind-centric  activity  (Shuell  1986).  You  may
            think that I align myself exclusively with cognitivism. On the contrary, I hold the
            view that these theoretical labels do not help much in conceiving the contingent,
            contextual  and  emergent  nature  of  the  phenomenon  of  learning.  Therefore,  a
            healthy scepticism helps raise questions about the adequacy of your and others’
            foundations in capturing the experiential landscape of learning.


            7  In eastern Wisdom Traditions, Middle Way has served as a perspective to articulate ontological
            and epistemological spaces that allow us to conceive the relative nature of sometimes opposing
            ideas (Nagarjuna et al., 1990).
            8  Smitherman (2005) calls these logics ‘narrow analytics,’ which are subservient to reductionist
            Newtonian science, which promotes dualism and narratives of stability.
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