Page 150 - Culture Society and the Media
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140 CONTROL OF THE COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRIES
            fifteen communications companies; and EMI and Associated Newspapers were
            each linked to ten.
              At  one level then, the available evidence gives reasonable support to  the
            instrumentalist position. Media corporations are increasingly integrated into the
            core of British capitalism and the material they produce for mass consumption
            does tend to support, or at least not to undermine, capitalism’s central values of
            private property, ‘free’ enterprise, and profit. However, this evidence  only
            describes the general coincidence between patterns of ownership and patterns of
            output. It does not explain it, although instrumentalists often present it as though
            it did, as in the Morning Star’s evidence to the last Royal Commission on the
            Press.

              All the national newspapers have property holdings and substantial links
              with a wide range of financial and industrial undertakings. They are thus
              closely integrated  with Monopoly Capital as a  whole. [Hence] it is  not
              surprising that the national capitalist newspapers strongly defend private
              enterprise. (Royal Commission on the Press, 1975b, p. 2)

            This argument moves from correlation to causality by assuming that the
            capitalist class act more or less coherently to defend their shared interests. At its
            crudest, this produces a version of conspiracy theory. At the very least, it has to
            assume that the owning  class intentionally pursue  their collective  ideological
            interests through their control over cultural production. There are fundamental
            problems with this position.
              Although it ultimately depends upon an empirical account of influence and
            control it cannot supply the necessary  evidence due  to the difficulties of
            investigating corporate decision making at the higher levels. So in the absence of
            direct evidence instrumentalists are  obliged to fall  back  on the second-hand
            sources provided by inside accounts together with what can be gleaned from the
            publicity  surrounding  take-overs and board struggles and scandals of various
            kinds. Apart from their obvious partiality, these accounts necessarily deal with
            atypical situations and so they cannot offer an adequate base for analysing the
            routine exercise of power and control. It is very easy to become fascinated by
            what goes on in the corridors of corporate power, by the personality clashes, the
            clandestine deals, the backstabbings and so on. But even if a reliable range of
            relevant information were available, this version of instrumentalism would still be
            open to the theoretical objections that it concentrates solely on the level of action
            and agency and that it identifies the core interests of capitalists with the active
            defence of key ideological tenets.
              This second assumption is not absolutely necessary, however. Other variants of
            instrumentalism stress the centrality of economic interests and see the production
            of legitimating ideology as the logical outcome of the search for profits. In Ralph
            Miliband’s words:
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