Page 217 - Culture Society and the Media

CULTURE, SOCIETY AND THE MEDIA 207
1937, for instance, 45 per cent of national daily circulation and 51 per cent of
provincial morning circulation, with an aggregate readership (including their
(9)
evening papers) of over 15 million people .
This domination over the principal agency of political communication
transformed the social standing of press proprietors. Men whose occupations
would have caused them to have been shunned by aristocratic politicians in an
earlier age as mere tradesmen were showered with titles and honours. As
Northcliffe’s sister Geraldine wrote facetiously in 1918, ‘in view of the paper
shortage, I think the family ought to issue printed forms like Field Service
postcards, viz: Many congratulations on you being made Archbishop of
Canterbury/Pope/Duke/Viscount/Knight, etc.’ (quoted in Ferris, 1971, p. 215).
Her facetiousness had a point to it: five of her brothers were given between them
two viscountcies, one barony and two baronetcies. Indeed, Viscount Rothermere
was singled out for an even greater honour. After campaigning vigorously in his
papers for the return of lost territories to Hungary, he was seriously asked by
leading Hungarian monarchists whether he would fill the vacant throne of St
Stephen as King of Hungary. He contented himself with an address of gratitude
signed by one and a quarter million Hungarians (a sixth of the population).
The tsars of the new media also exercised real power. Northcliffe’s campaign
against the shortage of shells on the Western Front in 1915 reinforced mounting
opposition to Asquith, and contributed to the formation of the coalition
government under Lloyd George in 1916. Their newspaper fiefdoms helped them
to gain high political office, as in the case of Rothermere (in charge of the Air
Ministry 1917–18), Northcliffe (Director of Propaganda in Enemy Territories,
1918–19) and Beaverbrook (Minister of State and Production 1941–2, amongst
other posts). They also exercised a more intangible but nonetheless important
influence in sustaining the dominant political consensus between the wars, and in
mobilizing conservative forces in opposition to radical change (Curran and
Seaton, 1981).
But the direct influence exercised through their papers was none the less
severely circumscribed. When pitted against entrenched political power, the
major campaigns initiated by the press barons were relative failures.
Rothermere’s campaign against ‘squandermania’ after World War I met with
only limited success, and his attempt to force the coalition government’s hand by
backing anti-waste candidates in parliamentary by-elections failed, despite three
notable successes. The Empire Free Trade campaign promoted by both
Beaverbrook and Rothermere also failed through lack of sufficient Tory party
support, and their subsequent attempt to force through a change of policy by
launching the United Empire Party was largely, though not entirely, unsuccessful
(Taylor, 1972). These and other failures underlined the fact that the mass
audiences reached daily by the press barons had an independent mind of their own.
A more realistic appraisal of the power exercised by press magnates reduced
their influence on internal politics within the Conservative party. When
Rothermere’s demand to be informed of at least eight or ten Cabinet ministers in