Page 144 - Democracy and the Public Sphere

Unfinished Projects: Reflexive Democracy 139

the ‘author’ of one’s own life is, at least, a powerful mythology or
‘counterfactual ideal’ that provides the backdrop for a ‘normal’
transition from childhood to adulthood and a subsequent sense of
self-identity, autonomy and responsibility. According to Habermas,
that mythology is imperilled by the prospect of parents, rather than
simply serving as biological conduits for a more or less haphazard
or incidental collection of traits, actually ‘authoring’ and selecting
aspects of a child’s genetic makeup. In contrast to socialisation
processes, genetic influences cannot be appropriated and modifi ed

through critical reflection and so the danger is that individuals fi nd

it more difficult to take ownership of the self. Habermas fears for
the ability of individuals to see themselves as responsible, in the
last analysis, for their own actions, decisions and personalities. Such

individuals may find it difficult not to imagine themselves to be
‘authored’ by someone else. So Habermas is not disturbed per se by
technology’s forays into new biological and reproductive territories:
there is no natural boundary which medical technology is on the
point of breaching. Rather, he is troubled by the prospect of seeing
the horizontal relationship between generations – or, at least, the
counterfactual ideal of an egalitarian relationship in which critical
reflection, questioning and appropriation of life histories can occur

– being displaced by a new set of inter-generational relations for
which there is no precedent. And those inter-generational relations
are critically important for both individual and collective groups
and their sense of place in the world. Individuals can selectively
appropriate or reject aspects of their heritage and socialisation within
modern societies. So too, entire generations can simultaneously learn
from and criticise or try to rectify the actions of previous generations.
According to Habermas, however, the scenario of liberal eugenics
raises serious questions about the structures of autonomy and
responsibility within future generations.
But we should also acknowledge that once the technology has
presented us with such a fork in the road, the current generation will
have to be responsible for whichever path it takes. The decision to
disallow embryo selection or genetic intervention for non-therapeutic
reasons – to improve longevity or to enhance particular attributes,
say – and to refrain from funding research and development in this
field, is in principle one that future generations may look back on

critically. In reflexive modernity, we face the problem of ‘playing
God’ whichever way we look. But whilst Habermas seems to miss
this rather basic point, his own emphasis on discourse ethics can, I

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