Page 363 - Discrimination at Work The Psychological and Organizational Bases

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discussion. Thus, a "back-to-basics" examination of the law provides in­
sights into how both legal thinking and the behavioral sciences can benefit
from mutual consideration of each scholarly field. PAETZOLD
The chapter unfolds as follows. First, I discuss the disparate treatment
model of intentional discrimination and the ways in which the notion of
"intent" fails to correspond with social psychological research on dual-
processing models of cognition. Affirmative action programs are briefly
discussed in this section. In the second section, I present the disparate im­
pact model and new ways to think about it for I/O and HR researchers.
Finally, the reasonable accommodation model of disability discrimination
is presented along with additional research questions stemming from cur­
rent research in the area. In summary, the chapter addresses three of the
major models of discrimination under the law.

DISPARATE TREATMENT AND DUAL PROCESSING

The most easily understood model of discrimination, and the one that was
articulated first, is the disparate treatment model, which serves to redress
intentional discrimination (e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 1973).
Under the law, intent is a term of art, reflecting not just a state of mind,
but also a motive, something that causes an employer to act in a particular
manner. Traditionally, intentional discrimination has been viewed as stem­
ming from dislike, hostility, or animus, although today there is certainly
widespread recognition that differential treatment may result even in the
absence of prejudice or bias. Nonetheless, proof of intent continues to be
a required aspect of a disparate treatment lawsuit, so it is important to
understand its meaning.

Legal Intent Conscious Control, and Disparate Treatment

One function of the law is to be a coercive instrument for change (e.g.,
Melton, 1986). When Title VII of the Civil Rights Act went into effect on
July 2,1965, Congress most certainly expected that behaviors toward the
protected classes would change so that employers would avoid illegal
discrimination. Title VII obviously could not prevent all forms of illegal
discrimination—e.g., some behaviors would persist as long as companies
could afford the penalties; some behaviors would persist until it became
clear that they were illegal—but the general expectation was that discrim­
inatory behavior would change. The legal view of intentional discrimina­
tion implies that change is within the ability of individuals who must make
important employment-related decisions. Often, but not always, it is the