Page 65 - Foundations of Cognitive Psychology : Core Readings

64 Jay L. McClelland, David E.Rumelhart, and Geoffrey E.Hinton

altered the way we think about the time-course of processing, the nature of
representation, and the mechanisms of learning.

The Microstructure of Cognition
The process of human cognition, examined on a time scale of seconds and
minutes, has a distinctly sequential character to it.Ideas come, seem promising,
and then are rejected; leads in the solution to a problem are taken up, then
abandoned and replaced with new ideas.Though the process may not be
discrete, it has a decidedly sequential character, with transitions from state-
to-state occurring, say, two or three times a second.Clearly, any useful de-
scription of the overall organization of this sequential flow of thought will
necessarily describe a sequence of states.
But what is the internal structure of each of the states in the sequence, and
how do they come about? Serious attempts to model even the simplest macro-
steps of cognition—say, recognition of single words—require vast numbers
of microsteps if they are implemented sequentially.As Feldman and Ballard
(1982) have pointed out, the biological hardware is just too sluggish for se-
quential models of the microstructure to provide a plausible account, at least of
the microstructure of human thought.And the time limitation only gets worse,
not better, when sequential mechanisms try to take large numbers of constraints
into account.Each additional constraint requires more time in a sequential ma-
chine, and, if the constraints are imprecise, the constraints can lead to a com-
putational explosion.Yet people get faster, not slower, when they are able to
exploit additional constraints.
Parallel distributed processing models offer alternatives to serial models of
the microstructure of cognition.They do not deny that there is a macrostruc-
ture, just as the study of subatomic particles does not deny the existence of
interactions between atoms.What PDP models do is describe the internal
structure of the larger units, just as subatomic physics describes the internal
structure of the atoms that form the constituents of larger units of chemical
structure.
The analysis of the microstructure of cognition has important implications for
most of the central issues in cognitive science.In general, from the PDP point of
view, the objects referred to in macrostructural models of cognitive processing
are seen as approximate descriptions of emergent properties of the microstruc-
ture.Sometimes these approximate descriptions may be sufficiently accurate to
capture a process or mechanism well enough; but many times, we will argue,
they fail to provide sufficiently elegant or tractable accounts that capture the
very flexibility and open-endedness of cognition that their inventors had origi-
nally intended to capture.We hope that our analysis of PDP models will show
how an examination of the microstructure of cognition can lead us closer to
an adequate description of the real extent of human processing and learning
capacities.
The development of PDP models is still in its infancy.Thus far the models
which have been proposed capture simplified versions of the kinds of phe-
nomena we have been describing rather than the full elaboration that these
phenomena display in real settings.But we think there have been enough steps
forward to warrant a concerted effort at describing where the approach has