Page 57 - Global Political Economy_Understanding The International Economic Order

CHA PTER T WO
political, economic, and other resources to encourage other states to
lower trade and other economic barriers, to prevent free-riding, and
to apply sanctions to states that failed to obey the rules or regimes
governing the liberal world economy. If there were no such strong
leader, international cooperation among egocentric states would be
exceedingly difficult, and there is a likelihood that the open, unified
world economy would fragment into national protectionism and re-
gional blocs.
The emphasis in this book on the role of political actors using their
power to influence market outcomes has some similarities to the posi-
tion of the public-choice school that argues that all political behavior,
including that of public officials, can be explained as the pursuit of
private interests by self-centered individuals and groups. However,
my position differs from this perspective in important respects. The
public-choice school implies that politics and markets can, at least in
theory, be separated; it argues that if there were no state intervention
in the economy, the price system by itself would determine all out-
comes. I believe, on the other hand, that the market is inherently
political. For example, the distributive effects of markets are deter-
mined primarily by the nature and distribution of property rights,
and property rights themselves and their distribution are inevitably
affected by political developments. Further, whereas the public-choice
position believes that public officials are motivated primarily by eco-
nomic interests, I myself believe that national security and prestige
play an equal and frequently an even greater role in motivating the
behavior of national governments.
Another difference between the public-choice position and my own
is based on different concepts of the nature of the state and the na-
tional interest. The public-choice position believes that the state is
simply a collection of those individuals who comprise the government
at a particular moment; the national interest is the combined interests
of the individual members of the society or of those members who
dominate the government. On the other hand, I believe that the state
is more than the sum of its component parts, that it has some auton-
omy from society, and that the national interest is distinct from the
combined interests of its parts. The state and the national interest
cannot be reduced, as the public-choice position asserts, to the indi-
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viduals who happen to be in power at any particular moment. Most
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Willett, I believe, concedes this point when he acknowledges that foreign policy
cannot be reduced to interest group politics. Willett, The Public Choice Approach to
International Economic Relations, 14.
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