Page 54 - Information and American Democracy Technology in the Evolution of Political Power

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The Information Theory of The Federalist
complexforbothcitizensandgovernmentofficials.Insmalldemocracies,
they believed, governments can be well informed about the detailed and
specific wants of their citizens. In large republics, government faces an
unattractive dilemma: settling for an incomplete and even vague impres-
sion of public and private interests, or collapsing under the complexity
of too much information by attempting to assemble a complete picture
of the public’s circumstances and wants.
The first horn of this information dilemma was posed by Richard
Henry Lee, the most widely read of the Anti-Federalists and among the
most politically distinguished. A Virginia Burgess, delegate and briefly
president of the Continental Congress, signer of the Declaration, and
U.S. Senator from 1789 to 1792, Lee observed that representation cannot
succeed on generalized information, but requires specific knowledge of
thecircumstancesofallcitizens.Writingas“TheFederalFarmer,”Leeob-
serves that states vary in “opinions, customs, and views,” and that “these
differences are not so perceivable among the members of Congress, and
men of general information in the states, as among the men who would
properly form the democratic branch.” Representative legitimacy, Lee
believes, can rest only on the basis of specific rather than general politi-
cal information. Regarding Congress, he continues: “I have no idea that
the interests, feelings, and opinions of three or four millions of people,
especially touching internal taxation, can be collected in such a house.” 7
There is simply too much information to be gathered, and so legislation
is destined to rest on inadequate information.
The other horn of the dilemma is described by George Clinton, also
a delegate to the Continental Congress, a general in the Continental
Army, later first governor of New York, and Vice President under Jef-
ferson and Madison. In the third “Cato” letter, issued in October of
1787, Clinton addresses the possibility that the information problem in
a large state might be solved by increasing the size and elaboration of
government, especially the number of representatives in the legislature.
He argues against that strategy as leading to unworkable complexity in
government: “Where, from the vast extent of your territory, and the com-
plication of interests, the science of government will become intricate
and perplexed, and too mysterious for you to understand and observe.” 8
That is, government cannot simply be scaled up in size to accommo-
date more interests and information, because complexity presents limits,
7
Morton Borden, ed., The Antifederalist Papers (N.p.: Michigan State University Press,
1965), p. 97.
8
John D. Lewis, Anti-Federalists versus Federalists, pp. 190–191.
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