Page 281 - Mass Media, Mass Propoganda Examining American News in the War on Terror
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Afghanistan and 9/11                 271

                  Rather than pushing the Secretary of Defense on the issue of potential mass
               starvation of thousands (or even millions), reporters were  generally intent on
               asking tactical questions about American military superiority and the success of
               "Operation  Enduring Freedom."  A short excerpt from one Q & A session be-
               tween reporters and Donald Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers reveals a lack
               of combativeness and  skepticism in the face of this "bread  and bombs"  cam-
              paign:
                  QUESTION: General, the bomber aircraft-first,   were ships used today? And
                  were bomber aircraft, both bombs and cruise missiles used again today as they
                  were yesterday?

                  MYERS: We will use some Tomahawk missiles today from ships. And there
                  were no cruise missiles used from the bombers.
                  QUESTION: And, Mr. Secretary, might I add, are U.S. and British forces at-
                  tacking Taliban  troop concentrations as well  as air defense and airfields and
                  other sites?
                  RUMSFELD: There have been some ground forces targeted.

                  QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the issue of air superiority, can you say whether or
                  not that's  been  achieved? And do you  have any sense of whether or not the
                  Taliban has been cut off from communicating with its forces?
                  RUMSFELD: I think it would be too soon to say that the Taliban air defense
                  and aircraft and airports have been fully disabled. That is not the case. We have
                  not got enough battle damage assessment to answer the question, but I suspect
                  that when we do get it, we'll find there's some additional work to be done.95
              While a single reporter later briefly addressed the U.S. cutoff of food to millions
               of Afghans, the issue was quickly dropped after Rumsfeld cynically dismissed
              the problem by explaining that the few people who did get rations "would  be
               appreciative."96 The lack of sustained skepticism in the face of official potential
              humanitarian disaster revealed  much  about  reporters'  lack of  commitment to
               adversarial, critical reporting on the food drop issue, and on the war in general.


                         Media Blackout and the Embedding Solution
              In retrospect, it seems clear that the mainstream press was prohibited from, and
              refused to, engage in in-depth, on-the-ground reporting in Afghanistan. Numer-
              ous complaints were made that reporters lacked the access needed to accurately
               report on the conflict. Paul Friedman, Executive Vice President of ABC News
              complained that after the first few days of military action, "we-and   therefore
              the American public-really  have no idea how it's [the war] going, what's being
              done in our name and what effects it's  having."97 As with the first Gulf War,
              reporters were mostly prohibited from getting close to the battlefield in Afghani-
              stan. Many throughout the press presented the embedding "solution"  as the best
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