Page 278 - Mass Media, Mass Propoganda Examining American News in the War on Terror

268 Chapter 10

lines focusing on the opposition of allies to U.S. military action. In total, the
military preparation frame dominated both allied opposition and negotiation
frames by a margin of three-to-~ne.~' On the occasions where anti-war activists
or critics were addressed, it was usually to denigrate them. Michael Kelly of the
Washington Post, for example, derided those calling for peaceful solutions, stat-
ing that, "Incredibly, in the light of 6,000 dead, some (mostly on the Left) have
persisted in the delusion that we are involved here in something that can be put
into some sort of normality-a crisis that can be resolved through legal or dip-
lomatic effort^."^' The Washington Post's editors agreed, defining the "legiti-
mate" expression of "self-defense" as requiring violent action.72

The "U.S. Strikes Back" but at What?

Most Americans assumed that the U.S. was largely bombing A1 Qaeda bases and
targets during "Operation Enduring Freedom" in retaliation for the 911 1 attacks.
Sadly, this myth was not entirely dispelled in most media reporting until months
after the completion of the bombing campaign. For the most part, Al Qaeda and
Taliban leaders were not willing to wait around and be bombed by the U.S. in
light of the United States' calls for blood. It was only after the completion of
major operations in Afghanistan that media coverage more soberly appraised the
failures of the U.S. in effectively targeting militants. The New York Times re-
ported that, seven months after the end of "Operation Enduring Freedom,"
"raids [had] not found any large groups of Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters'173; "vir-
tually the entire top leadership of the Taliban [had] survived the American
bombing and eluded capture by American-backed forces."74 International Secu-
rity Specialist Paul Rogers provided an explanation for the failure to destroy the
terror cells: "the A1 Qaeda network anticipated a strong U.S. response to 11 Sep-
tember, and had few of its key forces even in ~f~hanistan."~' Reports near the
beginning of the conflict indicated that much of the A1 Qaeda-Islamist network
that was actually in Afghanistan had already scattered into neighboring countries
such as ~akistan.~~ While the U.S. bombing campaign might have helped dis-
perse parts of the network and its affiliates in Afghanistan, it did little to nothing
in terms of dismantling or destroying them.
Afghan civilians and the Taliban, rather than A1 Qaeda operatives, were the
main targets of U.S. bombing in Afghanistan. By November of 2001, it was es-
timated that as many as 5,000 unexploded cluster bomblets lay throughout Iraq
as a result of U.S. military operations.77 Mark Hiznay of the Arms Division of
Human Rights Watch warned that, "these unexploded bomblets have in effect
become antipersonnel landmines. . . they pose an extreme hazard to civilians,
not just now but for years to come."78 On average, about 7 percent of the cluster
bomblets failed to detonate. The danger of unexploded bombs, coupled with the
fact that they are the same color as the "humanitarian" food packages dropped
by the U.S. at the time, made them especially dangerous to Afghans on the verge
of starvation. American bombing campaigns were often much more lethal than