Page 275 - Mass Media, Mass Propoganda Examining American News in the War on Terror

Afghanistan and 9/11 265

why they had supported attacks on the U.S. Writing for the Washington Post,
George Will explained in one Op-Ed that the U.S. was at battle with "the ene-
mies of civilization," and that "Americans are slow to anger but mighty when
angry, and their proper anger now should be alloyed with pride. They are targets
because of their virtues-principally democracy, and loyalty to those nations
which, like Israel, are embattled salients of our virtues in a still dangerous
world."55 Three years after the attacks, the New York Times repeated a similar
view regarding the terrorists responsible for attacking Americans. The paper's
editors deemed terrorism as "the tactic of preference for the self-obsessed radi-
cal movements of our age,"56 rather than a tactic also adopted by the powerful
nations against weaker ones or civilian populations.
Although many Americans did not want to hear explanations for the 911 1
attacks that implicated U.S. foreign policy in fueling anti-American hatred,
many others did. One opinion poll released in early October 2001 indicated that,
although Americans were content with patriotic expressions after 9/11, they
were also interested in hearing dissenting voices that took a critical look at U.S.
foreign policy. Approximately seven in ten questioned felt that peaceful protests
should be allowed, while 75 percent of those asked thought that the media
"should air the views of those who feel U.S. policies were to blame for the ter-
rorist attack^."'^ The public received little to no access to such anti-war views in
the mainstream press, however, during the run-up to the invasion of Afghani-
stan, or throughout the conflict itself. In this case, the mass media was actively
in contempt of majority opinion, which favored consideration of nonviolent po-
litical solutions in addition to violent ones.
The lack of criticism of the violent counter-response to 9111 led some ob-
servers outside the U.S. to react skeptically to media complicity in the drive for
war. Robert Fisk of the Independent of London spoke critically of American
journalists, who he felt were "cowardly, idle, [and] spineless" in their "loboto-
mizing" of stories regarding the "War on error."'^ Fisk criticized the relation-
ship between American government and media as too comfortable, and charac-
terized by too strong a degree of trust. He called "the relationship of the press
and television to government" "incestuous. The State Department correspon-
dents, the White House correspondents, the Pentagon correspondents, have set a
narrative where instead of telling us what they think is happening or what they
know is happening, they tell us what they are told by the spokesman. They have
become sub-spokesmen. Spokesmen for the great institutions of state."59
The general reaction to 911 1 throughout the American mass media and po-
litical establishment was one that lacked critical self-reflection. There was a
wholesale attempt after 911 1 to better "sell" what America was really all about,
rather than question whether U.S. foreign policy had fueled distrust of the U.S.
prior to the attacks. Rather, the government joined forces with the public rela-
tions industry to promote a positive image of the U.S. throughout the American
press and abroad. In the month following 911 1, the administration hired Char-
lotte Beers, a well-known advertising and public relations executive to become
the new Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Beers
had extensive experience in creating public-friendly images for her former em-