Page 274 - Mass Media, Mass Propoganda Examining American News in the War on Terror

264 Chapter 10

Burke concluded: "This is not to say that al Qaeda does not exist, but merely
that the labeling implies that bin Laden's group is something it is not. To see it
as a coherent and tight-knit organization, with 'tentacles everywhere'. . . is to
misunderstand not only its true nature but the nature of [decentralized] Islamic
A1
radica~ism."~~ Qaeda is not one unitary, central organization, operating with
top-down structured cells throughout dozens of countries. Rather, the Islamism
of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri often serves more as a sort of inspi-
ration for other islamist groups and their members (Abu Musab a1 Zarqawi being
one of the most prominent examples). Such groups likely maintain only loose
affiliations with A1 Qaeda, rather than close organizational ties. At other times,
Islamist groups operating throughout the Middle East and elsewhere completely
shun groups like A1 Qaeda as dangerous extremists.
Burke's analysis of radical Islamist terror networks stands in marked oppo-
sition to the less-nuanced, simplistic presentations purveyed throughout much of
mainstream dialogue on the Islamist threat immediately following 9/11. The
perpetuation of the myth of Iraqi ties to A1 Qaeda tie shortly before the 2003
invasion of Iraq stands perhaps as the most significant example of the overesti-
mation of the Islamist threat.

Media Reactions to 9/11: Calls for War Begin
The question "Why do they hate us?'was allowed significant attention after the
9/11 attacks, although perhaps not in the way those Americans posing strong
challenges to U.S. foreign policy would have expected. James Atkins displayed
his apprehension for the way the question was answered in most media discus-
sion in a piece in the progressive magazine In These Times, stating:

There is now occasionally an editorial or a letter to the editor in this country
suggesting that it might be time to ask ourselves if there just might be reasons
other than our innate goodness for being hated. This always provokes a flurry
of angry responses saying that whatever it might be, it certainly had nothing to
do with our Middle East policy. But the anti-American feeling in the Middle
East and South Asia has everything to do with U.S. policy. It is not because of
our democratic and moral principles, but precisely because we are seen as hav-
ing betrayed these principles in the Middle East that peoples of the area have
turned against

Many Americans may have been shocked by the argument that the United
States had something to do with inciting the attacks; they often believed that
their government was the victim of unprovoked aggression. Dan Rather's reac-
tion to 9/11 is symbolic of this larger refusal to acknowledge that there might
have been motivations for the attacks outside of "hate for American freedom":
"They hate us because they are losers. They see us as winners. And those who
see themselves as losers sometimes develop a deep and abiding hatred for those
they see who are winners."54 Rather's explanation, however, was limited in that
it did not delve into the stated motives of A1 Qaeda's inspirational leaders for