Page 277 - Mass Media, Mass Propoganda Examining American News in the War on Terror

Afghanistan and 9/11 267

remains in Iraq," while also lambasting Afghanistan as the "most likely first
target for armed force," due to its "harbor[ing] of bin ade en.'"^ No peaceful
alternatives such as extradition were seriously considered in the media and po-
litical establishment, as calls for violent reciprocity quickly became the norm. In
this explosive environment, anti-war activists who favored extradition through
the presentation of evidence were labeled (depending on who was attacking
them) as somewhere between nahe pacifists and "objectively pro-terrorist.'"6

Nonviolent Alternatives Denied

The relevant question in the mainstream media was not whether to use force, but
how best to utilize it. This debate was, as the Los Angeles Times accurately de-
scribed, "over the scope of the retaliation." Would the response be limited just to
Afghanistan, or should it also encompass other countries that were (previous to
911 1) designated as "enemies" by the Bush administration and its allies? The Los
Angeles Times elaborated: "Initially, Rumsfeld and his allies argued for a broad
campaign against not only Afghanistan, but other states suspected of supporting
terrorism, principally ~ra~."~~ Eventually, major media outlets would transition
to support the latter option, as the war against Iraq was framed as a vital step in
protecting U.S. national security through the "War on Terror."
While most media outlets deferred to the American government's claims of
"precision weapons" that limited "collateral damage," a few actively encouraged
war crimes as a path to vengeance. On Fox News, Bill O'Reilly described what
would happen if the Taliban refused to extradite bin Laden upon demand: "If
they don't [give him up], the U.S. should bomb the Afghan infrastructure to
rubble. . . the airport, the power plants, their water facilities and roads. . . taking
out their ability to exist day to day will not be hard.'"8 The vast majority of me-
dia commentators, however, did not openly call for the U.S. to commit war
crimes-they just failed to condemn the U.S. for the deaths of thousands of Af-
ghan civilians and the continued destruction of Afghan infrastructure.
The possibility of avoiding violence through the extradition of bin Laden
and other Al Qaeda operatives was not taken very seriously. In the rush to war,
newspapers and television news venues failed to draw attention to the Bush ad-
ministration's reluctance to pursue offers by the Taliban to hand over bin Laden
upon presentation of evidence. The administration's refusal to negotiate with the
Taliban showed that it was dead-set on going to war, rather than committed to
extraditing bin Laden through the use of diplomatic channels.69 Most of the
American media simply assumed without discussion that a nonviolent reaction
was not feasible or desirable. A comprehensive analysis of Washington Post
coverage from September 12 to October 6, 2001 (the period after the 9/11 at-
tacks, but before the beginning of "Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghani-
stan) found that nonviolent alternatives were heavily downplayed. Headlines
emphasized preparations for military action four times more often than headlines
emphasizing negotiations with the Taliban over extradition of bin Laden. The
"military action" frame was also emphasized six times as often as those head-